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Introduction 
 Mon intérêt pour l'immigration en France a commencé il y a quatre ans, quand j'ai 
commencé ma carrière académique à Connecticut College. Le professeur qui a enseigné 
mon premier cours de français avait un vif intérêt pour l'actualité, et elle nous a amené 
des articles des journaux français (Le Monde, Le Nouvel Observateur, etc.) fréquemment. 
Je savais que l'immigration était un sujet très polémique ici aux Etats-Unis, mais les 
articles sur l'immigration que mon professeur nous a présentés me semblaient différents. 
En plus d'être une question sociale et politique, j'avais l'impression que l'immigration en 
France avait une dimension identitaire. Je ne savais pas exactement comment le définir, 
et à ce point-là je n'aurais pas pu l'expliquer. Mais je voulais en savoir davantage.  
 Maintenant, quatre ans plus tard, je crois que je suis prête à explorer le lien entre 
l'immigration en France et l'identité nationale française. Ou plus précisément, je suis 
prête à poser les questions nécessaires pour arriver à une réponse provisoire. Parce que la 
vérité est qu'il n y a pas de réponse définitive. Il ne sera jamais possible d'offrir une 
solution manichéenne, ni pour les nombreux défis que l'immigration présente pour la 
France ni pour les multiples défis que la France présente pour l'immigration. Avec le 
discours politique, les conflits sociaux, l'aspect identitaire, les discriminations, la 
question financière, et les représentations véhiculées par les médias, l'imbroglio est 
beaucoup trop compliqué pour des solutions nettes.      
 J'ai donc trouvé plus prudent de parler des perceptions au lieu de solutions. 
Comment est-ce que les français perçoivent leurs populations immigrées d'aujourd'hui? 
Comment est-ce qu'ils les ont perçues historiquement? Quels sont les événements qui ont 
profondément influencé cette perception, et comment est-ce qu'ils continuent de résonner 
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dans la France contemporaine? Ces sont les questions avec lesquelles j'ai commencé ma 
thèse. Elles sont très larges, bien sûr, mais je n'aurais pas pu me limiter à une perspective 
unique ou une seule population migratoire. Mes expériences et mon éducation à propos de 
l'immigration et l'identité nationale en France ont été vastes, donc je me suis permis 
d'aborder cette thèse de manière très vaste aussi. Je crois que la présence d'un discours 
honnête et critique est importante, et c'est principalement ce que j'ai essayé de faire dans 
cette thèse: analyser la perception et le traitement des immigrés en France d'un œil 
critique. 
 Dans mon premier chapitre, je retrouve les origines de la perception de l'identité 
nationale française dans la Révolution de 1789. Il y a tellement de gloire et tellement de 
grandes valeurs qui sont automatiquement associées avec la France aujourd'hui, mais d'où 
vient cette gloire; d'où viennent ces valeurs indestructibles de "Liberté, Egalité et 
Fraternité"?  Qui a décidé de recréer et de réinventer la face de la nation après la chute de 
l'ancien régime? Les événements de 1789 forment la base d'une identité nationale 
profonde et abstraite qui persiste en France aujourd'hui. Pourtant, cette conception de 
l'identité nationale est problématique pour les migrants, parce qu'elle ne reconnait pas les 
particularités qui sont elles-mêmes le tissu de l'identité personnelle: "[Abstract 
individualism] is not the idea that the common nature of individuals is given or already 
there, but rather the fact that it is produced inasmuch as particular identities are 
relativized and become mediations for the realization of a superior and more abstract 
goal."1   
                                                        
1
 Etienne Balibar, as quoted by Wallach Scott, Joan. Parité! Sexual Equality and the 
Crisis of French Universalism. 15    
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     Dans les années qui ont suivi, La Terreur a établi le lien entre les étrangers et 
les criminels pour la première fois. La figure de l'étranger était un bouc émissaire 
commode, et toute personne qui n'était pas française a été soupçonnée d'activité contre-
révolutionnaire. Les stéréotypes à propos des étrangers ont augmenté pendant les années 
napoléoniennes. La succession des guerres a beaucoup élargi l'empire physique de la 
France, et avec ces nouveaux territoires sont nés de nouveaux stéréotypes sur les 
habitants. La xénophobie et la discrimination sont devenues encore plus répandues dans 
la deuxième moitié des années 1800, quand le processus de l'industrialisation a attiré un 
afflux d'immigrés sans précédent. Ces immigrés ont été reçus avec réticence par la société 
française, qui se croyait racialement et moralement supérieure.       
 Mon troisième chapitre développe cette notion de la soi-disant "supériorité 
française" dans le contexte de l'impérialisme en Afrique. La France a été une des 
protagonistes dans la Ruée vers l'Afrique dans les années 1880-1914, et ses conquêtes en 
Afrique ont intensifié le sentiment de la supériorité culturelle de la France: "The 
relationship between republican France and its colonies generated a specific language 
about admission into the French nation and about the meaning of republican citizenship."2 
Le gouvernement a justifié la politique coloniale avec la logique de la "mission 
civilisatrice": la France a envahi les pays africains pour venir en aide aux populations 
considérées comme primitives, et pour les introduire au mode de vie français. Cette 
logique présente l'entreprise comme un acte altruiste et humanitaire, mais ce n'était pas 
vraiment le cas. La France a maintenu une présence en Afrique pour son propre bénéfice, 
et rien de plus.  
                                                        
2
 Lehning, James R. To Be A Citizen: The Political Culture of the Early French Third 
Republic. 129 
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 A la fin de ce chapitre, je me concentre sur le cas de l'Algérie, parce que les 
relations entre France et Algérie étaient très différentes que les relations que la France 
avait avec ses autres colonies. L'Algérie (un territoire français depuis 1830) n'était pas 
seulement une colonie d'exploitation, mais aussi une colonie de peuplement. Des milliers 
de français, ainsi que d'autres européens, se sont installés durablement sur le territoire 
algérien. Là, ils ont bénéficiés d'un bon niveau de vie et de droits équivalents à ceux des 
français de la métropole: comme François Mittérand a constaté, "L'Algérie, c'était la 
France." Mais cette déclaration ne s'appliquait pas du tout á la population indigène: sous 
la domination française, les indigènes ont été totalement privés de leurs droits. Ils ont été 
exploités et marginalisés dans leur propre société, et leur ressentiment et leur colère 
envers la présence française a progressivement augmenté. En 1954, ils ne pouvaient plus 
le supporter: la Guerre Franco-Algérienne a commencé.  
 Le chapitre quatre est consacré à la guerre en Algérie, qui a duré huit ans  jusqu'à 
1962. Les français combattaient les rebelles algériens, qui s'étaient désignés comme le 
"Front National de Libération" (FLN). La guerre, caractérisée par la brutalité et le 
terrorisme, a été extrêmement dure, et elle a laissé une grande tache dans la mémoire 
nationale française. Du point de vue psychologique, cette guerre est une des plus 
traumatisantes que la France a jamais connue: l'armée française a systématiquement 
torturé ses prisonniers politiques en Algérie. Les soldats ont poursuivi agressivement les 
membres du FLN, et quand ils les ont trouvés, ils les ont torturés et exécutés. Il y avait 
des milliers de morts, et il n'est toujours pas clair combien sont morts de la torture. Le 
FLN a également torturé, mais c'est le souvenir de la torture française qui reste toujours 
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dans l'inconscient national: "The loss of this territory, considered as a 'national' territory, 
is still felt like an amputation in the collective unconscious."3  
  Après la guerre, il est devenu encore plus difficile pour le gouvernement et la 
société d'intégrer les immigrés et les réfugiés qui sont venus en France. La plupart des 
immigrés qui sont arrivés après 1962 étaient membres des anciennes colonies françaises 
en Afrique du Nord. Ces immigrés se sont trouvés face à des discriminations intenses et 
profondes de la part des français, et ils nourrissaient un même ressentiment profond en ce 
qui concerne leurs expériences coloniales. Il y avait donc des tensions sous-jacentes qui 
sont entrées en jeu dans la France post-coloniale, et le résultat a été une série de lois 
codifiant l'immigration dans les années 1990: le Traité de Maastricht en 1992, les Lois 
Pasqua en 1993, et les Accords Schengen en 1995.  
 Ces lois sont représentatives d'un changement dans la perception de l'immigration, 
pas seulement en France mais dans toute l'Union Européenne. La redéfinition des 
frontières et de l'espace commun selon les termes des lois suggère que les immigrés (et 
les étrangers en général) ont commencé à être perçus comme une menace pour la sécurité 
nationale. Les Accords Schengen, par exemple, permettent aux ressortissants de l'Union 
Européenne de traverser les frontières sans papiers de l'identité. Dans ce sens-là, les 
frontières européennes sont devenues plus fluides. Mais pour les immigrés, c'est le 
contraire: avec les Accords Schengen, les frontières extérieures ont été renforcées 
idéologiquement. Une barrière évidente s'est établie entre "nous" (les français) et "eux" 
(les immigrés), et ce binarisme allait se révéler très difficile à surmonter.   
                                                        
3
 Stora, Benjamin. "Histoire et Société: La guerre d'Algérie à la télévision rançaise." 
Interview by Eugénie Barbezat. 
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  Prisonniers de ces perceptions qui les avaient définis a priori, les immigrés de 
l'Afrique du Nord et leurs enfants devaient faire face à un grand nombre de défis. La 
même France qui se disait prête à défendre "la Fraternité" et "l'Egalité" avec son dernier 
souffle ne cessait de les marginaliser et les rejeter. La notion française de la citoyenneté a 
laissé très peu d'espace pour ceux qui n'étaient pas "français de souche," et les immigrés 
continuaient à avoir du mal à trouver leur place dans la société. Mais cela n'est pas de 
leur faute: le problème n'est pas seulement un problème d'intégration ou un "problème 
d'immigration," mais une véritable crise identitaire pour la France: "Some who write on 
the subject have suggested that hospitality as a French virtue has disappeared, crossed off 
the list of Republican principles by the government itself. This becomes, then, a question 
of French national identity, and not just an isolated political issue about immigration."4 
    Dans le nouveau millénium, cette crise a été catapultée en première ligne de la 
scène politique. Avant toute chose, l'immigration est considérée comme un enjeu 
politique, une perspective qui ne tient pas compte de l'expérience nuancée de l'immigré. 
Et malgré la nature complexe de l'immigration en France, la société française continue de 
chercher une "solution" blanche et noire. "L'affaire du foulard" en 2004 et les émeutes 
des banlieues en 2005 et 2008 ont incarné l'affrontement idéologique que l'identité 
nationale est en train de connaître, soulignant les tensions qui existent toujours entre la 
théorie et l'application. L'idée que l'uniformité (l'universalisme) assure l'égalité 
fonctionne théoriquement, mais pas dans la vie réelle.  
 Afin que l'immigration cesse d'être perçue automatiquement comme un 
"problème," il faut que la France trouve une façon d'accepter les particularités culturelles 
                                                        
4
 Rosello, Mireille. Postcolonial Hospitality: The Immigrant as Guest. 28-29 
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(religieuses, sexuelles, etc.) dans sa définition de l'identité nationale. Pour cela, je 
suggère qu'il faudrait également un nouveau vocabulaire pour parler de l'identité 
nationale, l'immigration, et l'intégration; un vocabulaire dépolitisé et sans connotations 
ou associations préalables. Enfin, je crois que la France doit continuer à faire face aux 
événements traumatiques de son passé. La honte et la culpabilité sont un fardeau lourd 
dont le pays doit se défaire avant de pouvoir progresser.      
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I. L'Origine de l'Universalisme Française: National Unity and the French Revolution 
 The one defining event in French history that can be identified as the origin of 
contemporary French universalist thought is the Revolution of 1789. This monumental 
event in French history changed the very fabric of the country, from the socio-political 
structure down to the very ways in which the French people defined themselves.  
 Before the advent of the Revolution, France was governed under a monarchy. As 
with most monarchies, this form of government did not afford the French people much of 
a voice. The only input in government matters that the people had was through the 
Estates General, an assembly comprised of representatives from three different groups: 
the clergy, the nobility, and the peasant class. 5 By the late 1780s, however, the people 
found their representation in government to be sorely lacking: the Estates General had not 
been called since 1614. Discontentment with the monarchy as a form of government (as 
well as discontentment with Louis XIV as a ruler more generally) began to grow. The 
monarchy came across as being too disconnected from the rest of French society, and, 
worse, indifferent to the hardships that a large percentage of the population faced. Recent 
involvement in the Seven Years' War left France's treasuries emptier than usual, sparking 
an increase in tariffs on widely consumed everyday products. The French people resented 
this general increase in prices extremely, because a series of unsuccessful harvests had 
already created a food shortage within the lower classes. The State was getting richer 
while the people were starving, and they didn't have any say whatsoever in how the 
matter was being handled. It was this combination of factors that gave rise to the French 
                                                        
5
 All background information on the French Revolution was obtained from the 
Encyclopedia Britannica online version. Entries: "France" and "The French Revolution."   
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Revolution.6 The people reached their breaking point on the morning of July 14th, 1789, 
when they flooded the streets of central Paris. They targeted the Bastille, a building that 
had come to represent the old regime and the values associated with it. This event marked 
the beginning of the Revolution: the advent of a new age for France.  
 This new age was first and foremost characterized by large-scale ideological 
shifts: the out-and-out rejection of the values associated with the ancien régime made a 
complete redefinition of national identity and self-perception necessary. This task of 
redefinition fell to the politicians, philosophers, and others in positions of political 
power. Not wanting to fall back into the social and political structures of the ancien 
régime, it was of the utmost importance to these men to completely reconstruct the idea 
of the nation in the imaginations of the French people. Fabre d'Eglantine, an actor and 
politician during the Revolution, acknowledged this project, proclaiming, "One must take 
hold of a man's imagination and govern it."7 The French people were vary wary of 
anything that represented social privilege or distinction after the Revolution, so a large 
part of the task that men like d'Eglantine were undertaking was to reconstruct the nation 
as a place where universal equality was prioritized and respected.  
 It was here that what Pierre Rosanvallon refers to as the "reign of abstraction"8 
made its debut. To combat the values and ideals of the old regime, the politicians had to 
represent very abstract entities like the nation and the individual in powerful ways. The 
way they saw it, if the French people were united in a universal way of thinking about 
                                                        
6
 Historians today are not entirely in agreement about what caused the French Revolution, 
but these are some of the commonly agreed-upon factors.  
7
 Rosanvallon, Pierre. The Demands of Liberty: Civil Society in France Since the 
Revolution. 21 
8
 Rosanvallon, 65  
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their nation, and about the relationship of the individual to the nation, social and political 
equality would follow. Social scientist Joan Wallach Scott discusses this presumed 
correlation of abstraction to equality in her novel, Parité!: "The abstractions [of the 
nation and the individual] allowed the revolutionaries to substitute the idea of formal 
political equality for the corporate hierarchies of the Old Regime and republican unity for 
the rule of kings."9 This quote speaks to the importance that such abstractions were given 
in counteracting the weight and ingrainedness of the past. Author and historian Pierre 
Rosanvallon, whose work focuses largely on the French Revolution, acknowledges this 
point as well: "To combat the 'Gothic colossus' of the old world, it was necessary to find 
a new and 'invincible colossus' to replace it, namely, the nation."10  
 As such, the idea of the nation attained a new importance in French life. The 
politicians and Revolutionary thinkers reconstructed the Republic as a highly abstract, 
all-important, singular entity to which the French citizens owed their unwavering 
allegiance. Jean-Paul Rabaut Saint-Etienne, a Calvinist pastor who was very active in the 
political sphere, stated that "In the nature of things, there is but one body, which is the 
nation."11 Poet André Chénier subscribed to a similarly glorified vision of the French 
nation: "Imprudent and unfortunate is the state in which a variety of associations are 
formed. Happy is the country in which there is no association but the state, no corps but 
the fatherland, and no interest but the common good."12 Chénier's quote in particular 
highlights the connection between the state and what he calls "the common good." This 
type of thinking is exactly what the politicians and philosophers of the time wanted to 
                                                        
9
 Wallach Scott, 15 
10
 Rosanvallon, 73 
11
 Rosanvallon  
12
 Rosanvallon  
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instill in the general public. Revolutionary thinkers believed that creating a glorified 
image of the nation in which they all lived would help unite the people, thereby ensuring 
universal equality and tranquility among them.   
 Another thing that the Revolutionary thinkers like Jean-Paul Marat hoped to 
achieve in promoting a glorified, abstract vision of the nation was a collective public 
opinion. If the people all thought about the French nation in the same way, and if they all 
felt the same way about their relationship to the state, the principles of Liberté and 
Egalité could not be compromised: "Nothing is more important for a victory of Liberty, 
for the happiness of the Nation, than to enlighten the citizens as to their rights, and to 
create a public opinion."13 This desire on the part of the politicians to construct a public 
opinion, and in doing so to create a united, indivisible nation, was a powerful one. And, 
luckily for them, it was not very difficult to realize. In light of the way the feudal system 
had been structured, there was a great deal of anxiety about exclusivity after the 
Revolution among the French people in general. So forming a collective public opinion 
was right in line with what they needed to do to eradicate these anxieties.  
 The readiness with which the people embraced the voicing of a public opinion is 
evidenced by the rapid proliferation of publications (newspapers, newsletters, and 
pamphlets) after the Revolution. In the 1780s, there were scarcely three-dozen daily 
newspapers circulating throughout Paris. But between 1789 and 1792, the number of 
newspapers distributed in Paris shot up to over 500.14 This figure is astonishing given the 
short four-year time period in which the increase occurred. The printing press had already 
                                                        
13
 Najedk, Carl: "Revolutionizing Rousseau: An Analysis of the Political Thought of 
Jean-Paul Marat, Georges Jacques Danton, and Maximilien Robespierre." 18 
14
 Hunt, Lynn. "The Rhetoric of Revolution in France." 78-94 
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been around for nearly four hundred years, so it was not the recent introduction of a new 
technique that was behind the surge: only an event like the French Revolution that really, 
profoundly affected French attitudes toward unity and collective thought could account 
for it. A similar phenomenon occurred with the production of plays: more than ever, 
actors were cast, scripts were generated, and crowds flocked to playhouses. It was, as 
Hunt aptly states, "a deluge of words,"15 produced specifically for the public (and, in the 
case of plays, enjoyed in public). Inspired by the power of the mass movement that made 
the Revolution a success, the French people were sharing their ideas and opinions on a 
larger scale than ever before. Word by word, phrase by phrase, and slogan by slogan, the 
development of the press and the theater began to define a new national identity in which 
universal thought and collective opinion were of the utmost importance.   
 Gatherings known as "Revolutionary festivals" provided social, interactive spaces 
in which the French people could develop their fledgling national identity. The festivals 
took place out of doors, and, in keeping with the times, were political in nature. Different 
political groups (for example, Jacobins) or different social tiers (for example, Aristocrats) 
would organize their own festivals, bringing people together to engage in dialogue and 
social interaction. Because of the way that the festivals were organized, they are 
reflective of ongoing social and political enclaves during the Revolution. But their larger 
significance as a means of developing the greater French "whole" (the unified society that 
the Revolution gave rise to) has been discussed rather recently by a variety of researchers 
and historians. Mona Ozouf, author of Festivals and the French Revolution, provides a 
clear explanation of the festivals' larger significance: "The purpose of the festival was to 
                                                        
15
 Hunt, 78 
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stage a harmonious society in which all differences were temporarily suspended. It 
instituted a sort of sacrament of social unity, melding bodies and hearts into a unanimous 
ensemble."16 Ozouf sees revolutionary festivals not as highlighting individual differences, 
but as a mirror image of the group mentality that the Revolution gave rise to among the 
French people; a "self-representation"17 of the unity and social cohesion they were trying 
to achieve. In this way, the festival was a means of exploring, and above all, of affirming 
the value of the changing French national identity.   
  These phenomena illustrated the development of a new national self-definition that 
was predicated on social unity and consensus within the national body. This development 
was accompanied by shifts in the way that the French people perceived their own 
citizenship. Much in the same way that the idea of the nation had been glorified, the 
notion of the individual as a citizen was glorified and abstracted. The politicians and 
Revolutionary thinkers wanted the French people not only to revere the nation and to 
respect the sanctity of liberty and equality, but also to reflect on their own individual 
relationships to the state. Citizenship was no longer just a mere title conferred upon a 
person at birth; instead, it took on a moral dimension, bringing with it duties and 
obligations that the French people were expected to live up to. Historian and Professor 
Jennifer Ngaire Heuer puts the development of this idea of moral citizenship into its 
historical context: "The...radicalization of the Revolution and the violence of the Terror 
in 1793 and 1794 expanded both the rights and obligations associated with membership in 
                                                        
16
 Rosanvallon, 22 
17
 Hesse, Carla. "Review: Festivals and the French Revolution." 232  
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the nation. Citizenship was...an individual act of will, an expression of personal 
patriotism and allegiance to the nation." 18  
 Wallach Scott links this idea of moral citizenship interestingly with the political 
proceedings at the time. After the Revolution, the abstract body of the Assemblée 
Nationale took the place of the actual, concrete body of the king.19 For practicality's sake, 
the Assemblée was to be comprised of a number of representatives. But instead of 
representing specific social factions (as in the past with the Estates General), these 
representatives would be there to represent the metaphorical body of the people as a 
united whole. According to this vision of universal representation in government, then, it 
does not matter who fills the role of representative. The representatives are not there as 
individuals with specific economic, religious, or sexual qualities, but as faceless "filters" 
for the voice of the rest of the French nation. This dissociation from particularity that the 
individual undergoes in the political sphere is at the heart of the way that the concept of 
the individual changed after the French Revolution. The importance of the individual in 
the political sphere no longer lay in specific traits that associated the individual with a 
particular group, but in the function he or she could play as a French citizen. In Wallach 
Scott's words, "The ability of any citizen to stand for, or represent, the nation derived 
from the understanding of political individuals as abstracted from their social attributes--
wealth, family, occupation, religion, and profession."20 The politicians and thinkers of the 
Revolutionary period were no longer interested in the political importance of the 
individual as a shareholder, as a father, as a woman, as a mason, as a Catholic, or as a 
                                                        
18
 Heuer, Jennifer. The Family and the Nation: Gender and Citizenship in Revolutionary 
France. 4 
19
 Wallach Scott, 13 
20
 Wallach Scott, 13 
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Jew. They were solely interested in the individual as an abstract, dutiful citoyen de la 
République.  
 This divorcing of particularity and of particular traits from the abstract citizen and 
individu was the beginning of a fundamental rift between the political and the social 
worlds. As Rosanvallon asserts, particularity was not important in the political world: "In 
democracy, 'the people' has no form. The body politic has no density; it is simply 
number, that is, a force composed of equals, of individuals equivalent before the law."21 
And indeed, particularity was not only not important in the political world, but it 
threatened the very nature of the national unity that the politicians sought to create. For 
them, national unity and equality depended absolutely on the abstractions of the 
individual and the nation, so to see individuals in any way other than abstractly was to 
sacrifice the national unity that the Revolution had helped build. In contrast to the 
political world, the social world was much more concrete. The "disparate and divisive 
realities"22 that the political world denied were still important in the social world, as 
particularities and distinguishing traits are the tools by which humans gauge their social 
interactions. One could not enter the family sphere, for example, and claim that he or she 
was not a mother, or a brother, or a grandfather, but a French citizen. Social realities did 
not allow for the kind of abstraction that the political world allowed for, and an 
opposition between the two was thus established. 
  It is this conflict between the concrete social world and the abstract political 
world that makes French universalism wholly unique: "The abstractions of individual and 
nation were the foundations on which theories of representation were built; they also 
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were the key to a distinctively French concept of universalism--one that rested on an 
opposition between the political and the social, the abstract and the concrete."23 As one 
might imagine, the tension between the social and political world that the use of 
abstraction created was problematic in a variety of ways. For one, it left the French 
people feeling (to employ Rosanvallon's word) disoriented: "[There was] a certain 
sociological stupefaction in the face of universal suffrage, as the inception of such a 
radically desubstantialized world left even its most ardent champions anxiously 
disoriented."24 Though they were probably not aware of it at the time, the French people 
were being essentially pulled in two directions: they belonged at once to the political 
world, in which each individual was highly abstracted, and to the social world, in which 
distinguishing social traits and characteristics continued to be relevant. It was not clear 
which "world" they were supposed to use as a referent for defining themselves. 
  Rosanvallon observes that, as the Revolution grew more and more chaotic and 
"disorienting," social bonds (family and friendship) attained an elevated importance: 
"The family was indeed celebrated as never before in novels and plays as well as in music 
and painting. The virtues of intimacy and closeness, the pleasures of the home, and the 
warmth of friendship took on unprecedented importance in this period." He then quotes 
directly from Robespierre to strengthen his argument: "It is telling that Robespierre 
called for the erection of altars to 'divine friendship.'"25 He posits that this elevated 
importance of family and friendship was the way that the French people "compensate[d] 
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for the abstract nature of the bond of citizenship,"26 which they could not directly relate 
to on an emotional level in their personal lives. Rosanvallon's argument for a correlation 
between the unrelatability of abstraction and the importance of family is highly plausible, 
but he does acknowledge that not many historians have established this link.  
 It does seem, however, that the people used the family model to make sense of the 
abstractions associated with the new national political structure. As was the case with 
most other representations of identity during the Revolutionary period, the politicians 
were the ones who provided them with this framework. In the new French Constitution of 
1795 (in a document entitled "The Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and of a 
Citizen"), the politicians drew from the lexicon of the family to help define the abstract 
notion of the citizen. Article 4 under the heading "Duties" reads as follows: "No man is a 
good citizen if he is not a good son, good father, good brother, good friend, and good 
husband."27 References to the nation as a "great family"28 also popped up frequently in 
political rhetoric. It is interesting here to observe the intersection of political and social 
terminology. Though the politicians abstracted the notions of the nation and the citizen, 
they still sought concrete social terms to describe them. And ultimately, this was an 
effective technique: using the language of the family to "explain" these abstractions made 
them more accessible to the French people.  
 Where comprehension continued to escape them was in the way that women 
figured into the abstracted vision of the individual. According to Wallach Scott, "abstract 
individuals were commensurable and interchangeable units, possessing in common only 
                                                        
26
 Rosanvallon, 5 
27
 Burke, Edmund. The annual register, or, A view of the history, politics, and literature 
for the year 1795. 77  
28
 Heuer, 9 
 21 
that independent rationality upon which political life was thought to depend."29 Social 
particularities did not factor into the equation at all: they were irrelevant in the political 
sphere. Every individual, then, regardless of sex or gender, should have been given an 
equal chance to participate in all aspects of political life. But this was curiously not the 
case. The Revolutionaries aspired to an idealistic vision of a national body governed 
equally by all French people, but in the end it was men, not women, who were afforded 
the rights and privileges of citizenship. The question, most simply put, is how did this 
happen? Egalité was a highly valorized concept during the Revolution, so it is baffling 
that the rights and privileges it entailed did not ultimately extend to women. It is even 
more baffling when Hunt's argument about patriarchy and patriarchs (as presented by 
Heuer) is taken into account. Before the Revolution, the monarch was widely referred to 
as the "père de la patrie," the father of the country. So when Louis XVI was executed, it 
was tantamount to executing a father figure: a strange kind of parricide. Summarizing 
Hunt's argument, Heuer describes a parallel between American and French republican 
imagery: "She [Hunt] contends that whereas American republican imagery celebrated the 
father, French revolutionaries distrusted patriarchs of all kinds."30 Such a fundamental 
distrust of patriarchal figures on the part of the Revolutionaries should logically have led 
to a subsequent glorification--or at the very least, incorporation--of women into the 
political sphere. Why did this not happen?  
  The lack of sex and gender equality during the Revolutionary period is something 
that is still widely discussed among today's historians. Touching on the topic, 
Rosanvallon quotes Abbé Sièyes, a clergyman and extremely active politician during the 
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Revolutionary period: "'Husband and wife are but a single political person and can never 
be anything else, although they may be two civil persons.' If women did not vote, he went 
on to explain, it was for 'the simple reason that no one wants to count the same vote 
twice.'"31 Sièyes seems to be inferring that the reason that women were not extended the 
same political rights as men (or indeed, any political rights) is because they were too 
closely tied to the family. A woman's domain was purely domestic, and any crossover 
into the world of politics was simply unfathomable. A diatribe directed towards a group 
of women who entered a political assembly in the late 1700s makes this division between 
women and the domestic and men and the political painfully clear:  "'Since when is it 
permitted to give up one's sex?' thundered Pierre Gaspard-Chaumette to a group of 
women who dared to enter the Convention. 'Is it to men that nature confided domestic 
cares? Has she given us breasts to feed our children?'"32 
 Based on Gaspard-Chaumette's fiery reaction, women's presence in the political 
sphere was not only unfathomable, but anger inspiring as well. And according to the 
writings of Rousseau, this was exactly the problem: "There is no parity between the two 
sexes as a consequence of sex...in a commerce that is too intimate...we [men] lose both 
our morals and our constitution."33 Rousseau held that the political space was necessarily 
a rational and objective space that was incompatible with the emotionality of women. 
Introducing women into the political space would be detrimental to the male politicians 
because women's "volatility" would inhibit men's capacity to make moral, objective 
political decisions. Wallach Scott links this type of revolutionary thinking back to the 
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immense abstraction that French thinkers and politicians used in defining the concepts of 
the individual and the nation: "The reasons for excluding women from citizenship were 
offered in sets of binary oppositions that posited women in terms of the concrete, the 
emotional, and the natural (hence not susceptible to abstraction) and men in terms of 
reason and politics (hence operating entirely in the realm of abstraction)."34 Women were 
thus not excluded from political life just because they would be a distraction to the men. 
The terms by which women were defined and perceived--"the concrete, the emotional, 
and the natural"--were in direct opposition with the abstractions of the political world.  
 This inconsistency in the abstract model was of crucial importance. Abstracting 
the notion of the individual and divorcing the individual from social particularities in the 
political sphere was supposed to guarantee universal equality among the French citizens. 
But women, because of their association with the natural, physical, and emotional world, 
were fundamentally incompatible with this abstract universal model, or universalisme. 
Though the politicians and philosophers did not realize it at the time, this problem had 
ominous implications for France: "Women's exclusion was not just about eliminating 
women's influence. It also served a major symbolic function as a reminder of the 
existence of irreducible difference--unresolveable antagonism within the national 
body."35 It was the first sign that the universalist model upon which post-Revolutionary 
France had been reinvented was flawed: it did not guarantee the universal equality that 
the revolutionaries intended that it should.  
 
 
                                                        
34
 Wallach Scott, 16 
35
 Wallach Scott, 16 
 24 
II. La Naissance de l'Etranger: The Terror, the Conquests of Napoleon, and 19th 
Century Industrialization    
 Though women were the first and most prominent group to suffer political and 
social injustices because of the flawed universalist model, they were not the only group. 
Foreigners and (as they were referred to at the time) émigrés living in France also faced 
extreme xenophobia and limitations on their rights. 
  As William Rogers Brubaker points out, this was a new phenomenon for France: 
before the Revolution, citizenship, and the particularity of being foreign-born or having 
foreign-born parents, did not hold much importance. "This formal legislative delimitation 
of the citizenry was unknown in the territorial states of medieval and early modern 
Europe. Citizenship remained inchoate."36 In other words, the boundaries between nation-
states, that render things like foreignness and citizenship important and relevant in the 
first place, were not developed to the extent that these qualities really mattered in 
political life. Under the monarchy, people were more likely to care about social class and 
religious affiliation than geographical foreignness.  
 Foreigners were even given certain advantages under the Old Regime that the 
native-born were not. Skilled immigrant workers were welcomed into the country 
eagerly, where they enjoyed advantages and privileges that often surpassed any 
advantages or privileges that were extended to the native-born French. The King also had 
no qualms about placing foreigners in important positions in his cabinet: "The personal 
guard of the King was composed of foreigners; [and] some high officials....were 
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foreigners."37 Even in the period directly following the initial 1789 uprising, foreignness 
was not polemic or widely discussed. In fact, it was quite the opposite: foreigners 
continued to be openly invited into the country. An excerpt from a political address by 
Bertrand Barère in August of 1790 evokes the optimism that most politicians shared 
regarding the presence of foreigners in France: "So let foreigners come to find in France 
a homeland; let them live here, let them enjoy liberty while they are alive...in paying our 
taxes, [the immigrants] will increase the mass of public riches, will augment our 
industry...and finish by adopting free France as their patrie."38 In 1789 and 1790, then, 
immigration was regarded as an economic and political advantage. Foreign labor and the 
creation of new industries would generate revenue within the new Republic, and the 
migrants' eventual naturalization would add to the pool of French citizens and increase 
the country's overall power and status.  
  All of this changed, however, in the years that followed. Foreignness was no 
longer approached with the same political and social indifference that it had been under 
the monarchy and in the first two years of the Revolution. It became instead grounds for 
divisiveness, and was fringed with negative connotations.  The political crisis and the 
involvement in wars leading up to the Second Republic and the Terror of 1793 created 
concerns about national security. The revolutionaries' fear of an invasion (or, more 
generally, of counter-revolutionary activity that would upset the freedom they had so 
desperately been working for) made for a political climate that was turbulent at best. 
Paranoia ran high, and foreigners, marked by physical difference, were easy targets. 
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Suspicious of counter-revolutionary activity abroad, people began spinning conspiracy 
theories, denouncing one another on the basis of supposed involvement in a foreign-based 
plot against the French nation. Foreignness thus became associated with national enmity 
and dissent with the revolutionary project: "'Foreigner' (étranger) was a potent term. It 
had a multitude of connotations, encompassing both those who were non-French 
and...those defined as political and social enemies of the revolutionary nation."39  
 As a result of these newfound associations, foreigners became subject to a whole 
slew of political restrictions and invasive measures. A large portion of these measures 
revolved around government surveillance and monitoring, designed to alert the French 
revolutionaries to any unusual or suspect behavior on the foreigners' part. They could be 
ordered by government officials of police to produce their identification documents at the 
drop of a hat, and they were no longer allowed to participate in political gatherings or 
public affairs. A striking example of this type of exclusion came when famous 
pamphleteer Thomas Paine, who had been officially elected to the National Convention 
years before, was then expelled from it on Christmas day of 1793.40 Even Paine's 
profound involvement in and support for the revolutionary project did not exempt him 
from being targeted because he was English. 
 But as bad as surveillance and exclusion from political bodies was, there was one 
measure that was unarguably worse. On April 15th of 1794, the government ordered the 
expulsion of all étrangers from "Paris, maritime towns, and military strongholds."41 
Given that the term étranger had taken on multiple meanings, expulsions were also 
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targeted at those who were suspected of being enemies of the State in general. The fact 
that those of foreign origin or foreign birth fell automatically into this category is telling: 
it was racist, xenophobic nationalism at its worst.  
    Given the severity of the situation, it is not surprising that these expulsions did 
not go uncontested. The Committee of Public Safety (the political body that ordered the 
expulsion) was immediately inundated with floods of appeals. The so-called "étrangers" 
wanted to remain where they were: many had been living on French soil for long periods 
of time, and had learned to call the country their home. Many also did not have any kind 
of substantial life to go back to. Some of them had even come close to fulfilling or had 
already fulfilled the requirements for legal French citizenship (mostly through marriage). 
Even if they were not technically French citizens, many had been active participants in 
the Revolution, and on this basis felt they should be afforded all of the rights and 
privileges of citizenship: "They also contended that regardless of their origins or juridical 
status, they had acted as patriotic French citizens and should be treated as such."42 Very 
rarely did these appeals result in actual exemptions from the order for expulsion. As 
German Law professor Friedrich Meyer wrote, "Sixty-two thousand foreigners went...in 
order to secure exemptions and be permitted to stay in Paris. But, after a severe 
examination, barely a tenth of these petitioners obtained a favourable response."43  
 The contrast between this hostile attitude toward foreigners and the tolerant, 
welcoming attitude that existed up until 1790 is clearly very striking: an "abrupt shift 
from xenophilia to xenophobia, from ostentatious hospitality to harsh repression."44 And 
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there does not seem to be one particular, isolated event that occasioned such a swift and 
drastic change in attitude. What, then, was the reason that the regard for foreigners 
changed so strongly and so rapidly? Rogers Brubaker's compelling answer centers around 
the development of the modern definition of citizenship. Before the Revolution, the idea 
of the nation-state as a sovereign political entity simply did not exist. This means that, by 
default, formal political rights and the idea of national citizenship did not exist before the 
Revolution either. Political theory and practice had simply not progressed to the point 
that these concepts were fully developed in peoples' minds. But the Revolution, according 
to Rogers Brubaker, "brought these development together on a national level for the first 
time."45  
 As a consequence of this kind of conceptual solidification of the nation-state, the 
definition of the foreigner took a definite, concrete shape. The counter-point to the 
concept of the citizen became, by default, the foreigner: "By inventing the national 
citizen...the Revolution simultaneously invented the modern figure of the foreigner. 
Henceforth citizen and foreigner would be correlative, mutually exclusive, exhaustive 
categories."46 No longer could foreigners be considered to be on the same tier as actual, 
bona fide French citizens. As Michael Rapport writes, "People born outside France had 
other loyalties and obligations, so only French people could enjoy full rights in France. 
Thus French citizens were differentiated from foreigners."47 It was yet another lapse in 
the equality that French universalisme was supposed to guarantee.  
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 The distinction between citizens and foreigners continued to play an important 
role in French politics in the 19th century. It was not, however--at least initially--as 
severe and as condemning a distinction as it had been during the Terror. In 1799, 
Napoleon Bonaparte, who had steadily gained power and recognition through years of 
military service, carried out a successful coup d'état. Overthrowing the Le Directoire, 
Napoleon and his collaborators established the French Consulat. The Consulat was for all 
intents and purposes a provisional government that concentrated the executive power in 
the hands of just a few men, the most powerful of which was Napoleon himself. As the 
Premier consul, he had virtually unlimited power to change the Constitution and govern 
as he pleased. In 1802 he was declared "consul for life,"48 and in 1804 he was made more 
powerful still: he was crowned the Emperor of France.49   
 In terms of foreign policy, Napoleon's reign was a political and moral mélange. On 
the one hand, historians almost universally acknowledge the lasting impact that the 
Napoleonic Code had on French international law. He established a number of laws 
surrounding immigration and the naturalization process that are still (at least, in essence) 
in effect today. Some of these laws are important purely from a procedural and pragmatic 
standpoint, such as the one pertaining to admission à domicile: "A foreigner who wanted 
to become French was obliged to obtain permission from the government to establish 
himself in France."50 These kinds of controls on who can enter a country on a permanent 
or long-term basis are now standard in modern immigration policy. Other Napoleonic 
laws are important because they constitute groundbreaking advances in immigrant rights. 
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One law helped children of immigrant or emigrant parents secure their right to French 
citizenship: "All born of a French father, inside or outside French territory, were declared 
to be French; children born in France of a foreign father could claim French citizenship 
status when they reached the age of majority."51 Another law ensured that foreigners 
residing on French territory, regardless of whether or not they had legally obtained 
citizenship yet, were to be extended the same civil rights as the French.  
 This kind of legal awareness of human rights where immigrants were concerned 
seems highly contradictory in the context of Napoleon's foreign policy. First and 
foremost (at least, in popular modern American memory), Napoleon is remembered for 
his territorial conquests and warmongering. And indeed, these associations are not 
inaccurate. But the fair and equal treatment of foreign populations residing in France was 
actually in full accordance with the Napoleonic Legal Code: "[Napoleon's system] 
remained true, from first to last, to conceptions of civil equality and human rights with 
which the oppression or extermination of a group...would have been utterly 
incompatible."52 This was written into the Code, and so from a legal standpoint was not at 
all anomalous. But immigration policy and immigrant rights were far from being the sole 
focus of Napoleon's foreign policy, and it would be misguided to qualify his legacy solely 
based on these laws. As Pieter Geyl very eloquently states, "Methods of compulsion and 
atrocities are inseparable from the character of the dictator and conqueror, and we shall 
see that Napoleon incurred bitter reproaches, at home and abroad, for some of his acts."53  
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 Geyl's words speak to the manner in which Napoleon regarded other cultures. 
Driven by an insatiable desire for French hegemony, Napoleon's armies invaded 
European country after country after country. Owing to his vast military experience, 
Napoleon was a tactical genius, and France acquired territory extremely rapidly: "As 
Napoleon waged war with most of Europe, the French territorial empire expanded; at its 
height in 1812 it included France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, the Italian peninsula, 
and many central and eastern European lands."54  Napoleon truly believed that the French 
culture and the French way of life were superior to any other, and that his efforts would 
eventually result in a harmonious, untouchable Europe united around France and French 
values. Summarizing what Napoleon himself wrote about his political project in Le 
Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène (1823)55, Geyl writes: "Had [Napoleon] been allowed to go 
his own way, or had he remained victorious, Europe would have become a federation of 
free peoples, grouped round enlightenment and fortunate France in an eternal peace."56  
 These words paint a highly glorified and idealized picture of what Napoleon was 
doing. In actuality, he viewed other countries--and, by extension, peoples--as nothing 
more than political tools. He measured their worth in terms of strategy and power: how 
much power he would gain through a specific country's acquisition and what kind of a 
strategic military advantage the country's location could give him. It is this approach to 
foreign policy that had a lasting negative impact on French/immigrant relations. By 
assuming French cultural superiority, Napoleon effectively paved the way for his citizens 
(or, more accurately, his subjects) to feel the same way. Because the French had been told 
                                                        
54
 Heuer, 123 
55
 An 1823 compilation of Napoleon's various writings by Emmanuel-Auguste-
Dieudonné, Le Compte de Las Cases 
56
 Geyl, 24 
 32 
time and time again by Napoleon that they were the superior European nation, they 
internalized this sentiment: "French vanity, too, enjoyed the superiority which Bonaparte 
gave [them] over the rest of Europe."57 This perspective remained with the French people 
even after Napoleon's reign had passed, working itself into the fabric of French national 
identity in subtle and complex ways. 
  This sort of awareness of what the French perceived to be their own cultural 
superiority is one of the reasons why immigration was met with so much hostility at the 
end of the 1800s. By contrast, immigrants and foreigners were not a political or social 
concern at the beginning of the century. As was the case in many Western cities, the 19th 
century was a time of immense industrial and economic development for France. The 
agricultural economy grew and thrived, creating a population that was distributed mostly 
in rural areas. But for the first time, it was a mobile population. The construction and 
expansion of France's railway system helped facilitate communication and connectivity 
among the people. According to historian Robert Tombs, the decade spanning 1840-1850 
was a particularly significant one for this kind of growth and development: "The 1840s 
were 'decisive years,' a time of record industrial expansion...with the growth of some 
large mechanized units (for example, in engineering, metallurgy, and cotton) and 
improvements in banking, transport, and education."58  
 Factories and industrial production continued to expand in the latter part of the 
19th century. This had the effect of drawing more and more people to France's major 
cities: Paris, Lyon, Marseilles, and Lille. Much of the movement was internal: French 
people and families who decided to make the transition from a rural life to an urban one. 
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There were also some instances of what James Lehning refers to as "urban workers,"59 
individuals who retained their homes in rural areas and pursued only seasonal or 
temporary work in the city. But some of the increase in urban population was due to 
immigration. The combination of the growing industrial economy and the unusually low 
birth rate in France created a real need for foreign labor, to which the international 
community eagerly responded. Immigrating to France was an appealing prospect for a 
number of reasons: readily available jobs, a developing economy, and a chance to live in 
a country that was both beautiful and sophistiquée. Through a combination of political 
power and the production of luxury items (Lyons silks, furniture, clocks, jewellery, 
books, and clothing60), France had developed "a valuable reputation for fashion and 
quality"61 that was alluring to immigrants. Moving to France, getting a job, and being a 
part of the exciting and upscale French lifestyle would be a dream come true. 
 The reality of what immigrants were met with, however, was far less rosy than 
what they had imagined. The major French cities (Paris in particular) were rapidly 
becoming overcrowded and dirty. The cities' infrastructures--housing, transportation, 
sanitation maintenance--had not developed to a level which could support the ever-
growing urban population.62 As a result, living spaces were often small, cramped, and 
unclean. Rodent infestations, crime, and disease were common. In the 1850s and 60s 
Paris also had a real problem with prostitution. It is this squalid urban setting that serves 
as the backdrop for novelist Emilie Zola's Nana. Besides having to contend with what 
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really were miserable living conditions, immigrants and immigration in general was 
becoming somewhat of a (mostly socially) contentious issue. Lehning identifies the 1870s 
as the approximate time that immigration began to gain negative attention in the social 
sphere: "Foreigners were certainly not a focus of attention before the last third of the 
century, nor were foreigners rigidly excluded from participation in activities that later 
became associated with being a citizen."63 A large part of this newfound focus on 
immigration was due to the extent to which the French economy relied on immigrant 
labor: "By the 1880s a new danger appeared: the French economy seemed increasingly 
dependent on foreign labor."64 The French people were concerned that, should there be a 
decrease in the availability and accessibility of foreign labor, their economy would suffer.  
 The potential volatility of the international labor market rendered this concern 
understandable. But along with it was a healthy dose of plain and simple xenophobia. For 
the first time, the French people felt encroached upon and threatened by the large number 
of immigrants living among them. In 1886, lawyer and politician Alexandre Bérard 
published a report in which he harshly condemned the "flot étranger" that was "invading" 
the country. The majority of the French public shared this anti-immigrant sentiment, 
especially when it came to employment. Because the French economy was not doing well 
in middle and late 1880s, employment and job security were particular concerns. The 
French people resented the fact that they had to compete with foreign workers for the 
limited number of available positions: "[The economic crisis] did not mean that foreign 
workers already in the country returned home. They instead became a part of the floating 
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mass of workers tramping around the country...looking for work."65 To unemployed 
French workers, it was both unfair and nonsensical to fill job openings with foreign labor 
rather than "native" labor. And from a performance standpoint, they felt themselves 
superior to foreign workers in every way: "French workers saw themselves replaced by 
foreigners whose apparent merit came from their obsequiousness. Immigrants drove down 
not only the price of labour but also the character of the worker."66  
 The integrity of foreign workers was thus called into question, establishing a clear 
hierarchy in which the native Frenchman was at the top and the immigrant workers at the 
bottom. Slurs and stereotypes that targeted foreigners (particularly Italians and Germans) 
became common. A prominent French legislator named A. Pradon chose to refer to 
Italians and Germans collectively as the "mob," and maintained that Germans were 
"vagrants" and "vagabonds" who selfishly came to France for personal gain.67 The 
number of instances of violence against foreign workers also began to mount, making an 
astonishing leap from just five incidents over a span of nine years to seventy-seven 
incidents over a span of twelve.68 Most of these incidents took place in densely populated 
urban areas like Marseille, Paris, and the Nord region of France. When they unfolded, 
they tended to begin in the workplace. Depending on the nature of the altercation, they 
had the potential to escalate into massive public protests: "In these apparently 
spontaneous events, the workers who were the initiators of the disturbance were quickly 
joined by a wide cross-section of the population, rapidly mobilizing thousands, 
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sometimes as many as ten thousand."69 The fact that what began as mere workplace 
disturbances often spiraled so far out of control is a testament to the level of anxiety the 
French people felt in the presence of foreigners. The convergence of the public on the 
occasion of such an event resulted in what was effectively a demonstration, complete 
with flag-waving and the chanting of slogans. Amidst cries of "Vive la France!", the 
French people called for the expulsion of foreign workers and the return of their patrie.  
 Concerns about foreigners were multiplying on the political level as well. 
Attitudes that were prevalent a hundred years earlier during the Revolution began to 
resurface: foreigners were once again suspected of espionage and perceived as a threat to 
national security. The French government chose to assuage these fears by implementing a 
series of surveillance measures, all of which were designed to "keep track" of the 
comings and goings of immigrants and foreign workers. The most significant of these 
measures was an 1888 law that mandated two things: one, that all immigrants possess 
"pièces justificatives" by which they could prove their identity; and two, that all 
foreigners register with the mairie in their town or city of residence.70 This law 
constituted an unprecedented manifestation of xenophobic paranoia which was all the 
more disturbing because it came from the state level. Immigration had been problematic 
in the social sphere in the past, but never before had it been so blatantly challenged by 
the French government. Lehning explains that the decision to pass what were really very 
stringent measures for the time was probably related to the 1871 loss of the Franco-
Prussian War: "The foreigners who seemed to be 'invading' France were a threatening 
presence in a country that had only fifteen years earlier suffered military invasion and 
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defeat."71 Immigration was thus an unwelcome and unwanted reminder of the events of 
the recent war, the first of many international conflicts to remain in France's historic 
memory and influence its attitude toward foreigners.  
 This violent political and social reaction immigrants and foreigners in the late 
1880s had very interesting implications for France's own national identity. At the same 
time as immigrants and foreigners were criticized and degraded in the public sphere, 
French national identity was subtly elevated in the minds of the people. In Lehning's 
words, "[The} descriptions of the dangers and threats posed by foreigners also articulated 
the positive qualities and contributions of French workers as citizens of the French nation 
and the Republic."72 To degrade foreigners was also, by default, to praise Frenchness. 
Tombs chooses a sparser yet equally impactful way of describing this phenomenon: "The 
influx of foreign workers...increased a sense of Frenchness as a by-product of 
xenophobia."73 Anti-immigrant sentiment was thus, in a strange sort of way, an 
opportunity for the still-new Republic to valorize its own national identity. This is not to 
say, of course, that this experimentation with self-identification was innocent. As 
Lehning points out, the way in which national symbols and slogans were incorporated 
into displays of anti-immigrant sentiment constituted a "French nationalism conflated 
with republicanism."74 But it was nonetheless an exploration of French national identity 
such that the Republic had had few occasions for in years prior. 
  The surveillance law of 1888 also affected the notions of the individual and the 
citizen that had been established during the Revolution. Because of the law's insistence 
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on foreigners' registration in France, nationality became distinctly important when 
considering individual identity: "It was this penetration of state authority which thrust 
nationality forward as the most important facet of an individual's identity."75 During the 
Revolution, individual identity was defined by Frenchness. The importance of the 
individual in the context of the national whole was that he or she was first and foremost a 
French citizen. After the law of 1888, the premise of individual identity remained 
fundamentally the same, but with a subtle and extremely important difference: the 
relationship of the individual to the national whole could now also be defined by 
foreignness. The surveillance law rendered it impossible to think about being a French 
citizen without also considering the possibility that one was not a French citizen, 
precisely because nationality was constantly being called into question. If one was 
French, one belonged to the national whole. If one was foreign, one simply did not.  
 The kinds of duties involved in being a "true" French citizen also changed. The 
surveillance law ultimately had the effect of trickling down: not only was the government 
surveilling on a national level, but individual French citizens were also surveilling on an 
individual and local level. Lehning provides an excellent explanation of how this local 
surveillance operated: "The [law]...established a relationship between the citizens of the 
Republic, who would watch the foreigners in their midst, and those foreigners 
themselves, who remained marked as separate from the community in which they 
lived."76 This kind of social policing was civically acceptable in that it was approved of 
and encouraged by the French government, but it also became a compulsion that allowed 
paranoia to run rampant and the stigmatization and stereotyping of foreigners to develop 
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freely. By the end of the 19th century, immigration and foreign presence in France was a 
full-fledged polemic issue on both social and political fronts.  
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III.  Le Début du Vingtième Siècle: French Colonial Expansion and  
Pre-War Algeria  
 One of the major factors that shaped the French perception of immigration in the 
early 1900s was the country's steady pursuit and acquisition of colonial possessions in 
Africa. French imperialism was by no means new to the 20th century: Herbert Luethy 
states that France "unquestionably possesses the oldest and greatest colonial tradition of 
all European nations."77 Its culminating point in the early 1900s, however, had huge 
implications for both French foreign policy and the French perception of foreignness in 
general. It is therefore necessary to understand the ways in which France played into and 
internalized the European imperialist project.  
 Throughout the 1800s, Germany, France, and Britain (and for a time, Belgium) 
were actively competing for economic and military supremacy in Western Europe. This 
desire for supremacy was closely linked to the acquisition and control of foreign territory, 
and in that respect it was nothing new: state power and the expansion of territory had 
gone hand-in-hand for ages. The particular brand of European colonialism that developed 
as the 1800s drew on, however, was not something that had been seen before on the 
world stage. Instead of simply entering foreign countries and claiming them as their own, 
the European powers were gleaning distinct economic advantages from their colonial 
conquests: "It was colonisation on a mercantilist, almost feudal pattern...large-scale 
ownership of land was introduced and trading stations were established."78 The colonizers 
established long-term industrial and trading mechanisms abroad in the interest of 
extracting the country's raw materials and shipping them back home for domestic use. It 
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was exploitation in its purest form, and in terms of power dynamics, it was enormously 
effective: bereft of resources and any sort of legal or social power, the colonized peoples 
could do little to combat the European presence. 
 The effectiveness of the exploitative system in meeting European expectations is 
evidenced by what is now known as the "Scramble for Africa." The resource rich, 
minimally explored, and (soi-disant) uncivilized continent of Africa was the perfect 
tableau for colorful European colonial dreams--especially when diamonds were 
discovered in Africa's interior.  In 1884 and 1885, the European powers held the Berlin 
Conference on Africa, where delegates heatedly discussed the "fairest" way to proceed 
with claiming territory in Africa. In reality, the conference was little more than an excuse 
for the European powers to hash out "who gets what": by the time the conference was 
over, the map of Africa they had been using as a guide was completely marked up. All 
unclaimed territory had been divvied up among nine very eager European countries, all of 
which wasted no time claiming the countries allotted to them. In 1880, European powers 
controlled ten percent of the continent, but by the year 1900 only two African countries 
remained free of colonial rule.79 
 France's share of African territory was significant: by 1898, France had conquered 
nearly all of Western Africa and part of Central Africa as well.80 The acquisition of such 
a vast expanse of territory in such a short time was met with a variety of reactions from 
the French people. Many did not view the colonial endeavor favorably because it did not 
correspond with the core values upon which the Republic had been founded: it went 
entirely against the principles of liberté, égalité, and fraternité that the French people 
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held so dear. The majority of the dissenters' doubts were, however, quick to fade. As time 
passed, it became clear that colonialism could be incredibly useful, both for the economic 
advantage it secured France over the rest of Europe and the prestige it entailed. They thus 
gradually became reconciled to the idea: "Republicans...convinced themselves that 
associating the colonies closely with France would ensure that colonial peoples would 
share the advantages of modern French political life to their mutual benefit."81    
 As far as justifications for colonialism went, this was a common one. Just as 
Napoleon had done some two hundred years ago, the European colonial powers justified 
their conquests in Africa and elsewhere in the name of the "civilizing mission": the 
colonizer moves in, sets up camp, and is gracious enough to share its bounty of European 
knowledge and values with the primitive native societies. Such a rationale implied that 
both societies benefit equally from colonialism: the colonized are enlightened by the 
"superior" European culture and the colonizer's empire expands. This message is 
delivered loud and clear within the following statement, uttered by 19th century writer 
and politician Prévost-Paradol: "Africa...should not be for us simply a trading post...it is 
a French land which as soon as possible should be peopled, possessed, and cultivated by 
Frenchmen."82 This vision, in which both societies mutually benefit from the colonial 
presence, was the official narrative at the time, adopted by European governments and 
disseminated to a wide and very receptive public.   
 The reality of what was going on in colonized areas was, of course, much less 
idyllic. Contrary to what the European press was printing back home, native peoples were 
routinely and systematically massacred by colonial regimes. Military activity was poorly 
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regulated, giving the soldiers and other personnel living abroad free reign to do as they 
wished. And when word of questionable goings-on abroad did trickle back to Europe, 
officials usually had little to say: "Parliament made no protest; it did not object to...[for 
example] the methods of the high officials of the Moroccan protectorate, who provoked 
riots and unrest on their own initiative in order to get rid of an inconvenient sultan."83 
Additionally, stringent and discriminatory laws established by the colonizers left the 
native people with little to no rights as to their own fate or the fate of their country. Most 
were deprived of the right to vote, and for those who were granted a voice were usually 
attributed votes that had lesser weight than the votes of the Europeans. This kind of 
oppression was what gave colonialism a bad name--a period of history that truly "ought 
not to have existed."84   
 The harsh reality of colonialism was a sharp and direct contrast to the naive 
optimism and excitement with which many Europeans regarded the colonial project in 
Africa. As far as France is concerned, no country serves as a better model for examining 
both "sides" of colonialism than Algeria.  The French tie with Algeria is one of its oldest 
colonial relationships, and it is quite possibly the single most influential foreign 
relationship in all of France's history. Because of the intensity with which France linked 
itself to Algeria and because of the subsequent violence which tore apart both countries, 
the Franco-Algerian relationship has had a profound impact on notions of French national 
identity and self-hood. Though nearly half a century has passed since decolonization, the 
reverberations of France's ties with Algeria can still be felt in modern-day France, 
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strongly affecting French attitudes toward immigrants, foreigners, and their own national 
identity.  
 France's relationship with Algeria began long before the colonial fervor in Europe 
was in full swing. In May of 1830, a fleet of ships carrying French militiamen took the 
land by storm: "On May 16,1830, a fleet of five hundred French ships headed from 
Toulon to Algiers...on July 5,1830, the dey85 of Algiers signed the act of surrender. The 
French colonial conquest had begun."86 From this date forward, Algeria was a French 
colonial possession--that much was definitive. What was still unclear was how the 
military would choose to proceed: "After the surrender of the Algiers authorities, the 
French military held effective power, but was divided on what course to follow. Should 
there be limited or total occupation?"87 The high level of resistance that the French army 
encountered complicated the question. Several religious sects in Algeria declared holy 
war on the French, spurring a series of bloody clashes that continued for the next forty 
years.  
 It was not until 1871 that the French army was able to effectively put a stop to the 
rebellion and begin withdrawing troops from the country. When they left, they transferred 
the political power to thousands of European settlers (known as colons) who lived there. 
Drawn by (among other things) the lower cost of living and the promise of farmable land, 
Europeans flocked to Algeria--French, Spanish, Italian, and Maltese alike. 88 By 1870, 
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there were upwards of 250,000 colons living in Algeria,89 and by 1896 the number of 
Europeans born on Algerian soil surpassed the number of immigrants themselves.90 
  The ensemble of these Europeans living in Algeria came to be referred to as pieds 
noirs,91 and the mere fact of their presence made the Franco-Algerian relationship 
markedly unique. Not once on any of its other colonial territories had France established 
a colonie de peuplement, or settlement colony, the way it did in Algeria. Bona fide 
French citizens lived, worked, and built lives and families there, creating stronger and 
more "intimate" ties between the two countries than France had ever had before. As 
Luethy claimed, "[Algiers is] as much a French city as Marseilles or Bordeaux, not the 
capital of a colony, but of a department of France."92 Stora uses similar language, 
referring to Algeria as "a continuation of France on the other side of the 
Mediterranean."93  Most famously of all, François Mittérand (who held the post of Prime 
Minister in France at the time) publicly announced that "l'Algérie, c'est la France."  
 Such statements are demonstrative of the mixture of idealism and myopia that 
characterized political discourse about the French/Algerian relationship at the time. If 
Algeria truly had been France, or even a trans-Mediterranean extension of France, the 
Algerians would not have suffered the type of injustices that were continuously imposed 
upon them from the very beginning of French occupation. Despite what politicians like 
Mittérand were saying, it had never been their intention to extend equal rights to the 
Algerian natives: "[France's] aim was to ensure the absolute and complete subjugation of 
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the population to the needs and interests of colonization. The colons enjoyed full rights; 
the colonized were 'subjects' not 'citizens.'"94 
 The ruthlessness with which the French authorities oppressed the Muslim 
populations of Algeria is perhaps most evident in the context of housing and land. Ever 
since the inception of the colony in 1830, the French had no qualms about taking land 
from the Algerian people. They took what land they needed for their own enterprises by 
force, regardless of whether or not the land was designated holy or religious land by the 
natives. On the basis of their soi-disant cultural and racial superiority, they felt entitled to 
it. In time, this attitude generated some extremely alarming statistics: "Between 1871 and 
1919, 215 million acres were handed over to the colons...by 1919, the Muslims had lost 
18.5 million acres, which the state, individuals, and major companies had divided up 
amongst themselves."95  
 This loss of land was devastating for the native people, and it occurred on such a 
massive scale that it changed the entire layout of Algerian cities: "In the city of Algiers 
alone, excluding its outskirts, 120 slums, like a cancer growing on all available land, had 
some 80,000 Muslims crowded together in unbelievable living conditions." Astoundingly, 
the Casbah96 sustained even worse levels of overcrowding than the slums: "The 
Casbah...crammed 70,000 residents into its 50 acres, breaking world records in human 
density."97 As if being made to live in unimaginable conditions were not enough, the 
Muslim Algerians were also subject to a series of repressive measures that were solidified 
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by the Code de l'Indigénat (Native Code). The Code, which came into effect in 1881, 
included "an internal passport system, forced labor, and penalties for acts or remarks 
prejudicial to French sovereignty."98 Because the natives were at this point completely 
disenfranchised, they were powerless to combat the Code that was imposed upon them.   
 The treatment of the native Algerians following World Wars I and II is also an 
injustice that must not be overlooked. During World War I, large numbers of indigenous 
Algerians and pieds noirs alike fought in Europe for the French cause. Their reasons for 
doing so were varied: some, feeling a genuine allegiance to the French nation, 
volunteered. Some agreed to fight in hopes that their service would lead to 
enfranchisement and social advancement. Many, doubtless, were forced into conscription. 
Whatever their reason, most met the same tragic ending. A staggering total of 
approximately 22,000 pieds noirs and 25,000 Muslim soldiers lost their lives to the war.99  
 This was obviously devastating on both a personal and a national level. But for a 
number of slightly less obvious reasons, it was especially devastating for the native 
Algerian veterans who survived the war. The deployment had provided them with the 
opportunity to see Western society firsthand. For many, it was their first time seeing (let 
alone inhabiting) the France that had been so present in their lives, so--despite the 
context in which it took place--their experience in Europe left quite an impression. 
Seeing Frenchmen on their own soil, witnessing a much higher standard of living, and 
experiencing life free of the Native Code was, for the native Algerians especially, an eye-
opening experience. If they were granted the same rights as the colons, this is what life 
could be like every day and all of the time. Returning to Algeria's Native Code was thus 
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extremely difficult: "Dissatisfaction was the very logical result of the gap between the 
possibilities they had glimpsed in France and the wretchedness of what was now their 
daily fate."100 After getting a taste of freedom, it was virtually impossible to go back to 
the way things were. In this way, World War I triggered an important shift in Algerian 
attitudes toward the French occupation: the seeds of major unrest had been sewn.   
 The interwar period was characterized both by immigration and emigration: 
thousands more Europeans poured into Algeria, and significant numbers of both pieds 
noirs and native Algerians chose to immigrate to France. The latter group was motivated 
largely by economic reasons. A growing population made for a dwindling number of jobs 
in Algeria,101 and reconstruction efforts after the war opened up plenty of employment 
opportunities in France. France itself had suffered an enormous number of casualties in 
the war (1,322,000 dead and another 3 million wounded),102 and this fact combined with 
historically low French birth rates made the need for foreign labor virtually inexhaustible. 
To ensure that labor needs were met, France implemented an economic immigration 
program for the first time, whereby the government could control the flow of incoming 
workers as it saw fit: "In contrast with the pre-war situation, where immigrant labor was 
largely unregulated, the State itself took charge of organizing the supply of foreign 
workers."103 This kind of formal recruitment provided Algerian and other North African 
residents with official channels to go through if they wished to immigrate to France. It 
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was through this mechanism that France became "the world's [single] largest importer of 
people."104  
 In spite of this claim, French attitudes vis-à-vis the unprecedented number of new 
arrivals in their country were usually blatantly hostile. The French overlooked the fact 
that these immigrants were doing them a service by helping to rebuild their country, 
giving way instead to resentment and deeply-rooted prejudice: "However much they may 
have benefited from being released from the dirtiest and most menial jobs, [French native 
workers] strongly resented the presence of foreigners in their midst and rarely extended a 
hand of welcome or friendship."105 Racist discourse contributed greatly to French 
hostility toward immigrants, often targeting Algeria's Arab population. According to late 
19th century anthropologist Gustave Le Bon, "the intellectual and moral character of a 
race was the basis for classification," and in this regard "the Arab population of Algeria 
was distinctly lacking." Le Bon also stated that the indigenous Algerians were nothing 
more than "[the] degenerate products of all the conquerors who had ruled them." 106 In 
view of all that the Algerian and other African immigrants had done for France, the 
barbarous treatment they received was a moral outrage.   
 Back in Algeria, the restrictions of the Native Code continued to weigh heavily 
upon the Muslim Algerians. Disillusioned by the events of World War I, the majority 
firmly opposed the French presence in their country. Unrest was steadily growing, 
becoming more and more distinguishable from the "veiled, latent form"107 it had assumed 
in the past. There was a small glimmer of hope for the native population in 1936 when 
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the French government proposed the Blum-Viollette Plan. In short, the Plan would "grant 
political equality to a small proportion of the Algerian population, gradually extending it 
to the majority. Without abandoning Muslim status, a minority would thus have obtained 
the same political rights as French citizens."108 The Plan was everything the native 
Algerians had ever wanted from the French.  
 The Plan did not, however, come to fruition: the discussion surrounding its 
passage was so heated and so lengthy that "an attitude of distrust, then of hostility, 
developed"109 between Algerian nationalist groups and the French government. The 
tension eventually became so acute that any possibility of the Plan going into effect 
disappeared. This affair transformed the social climate in Algeria entirely. By proposing 
the Plan and failing to implement it, the French government had effectively dangled the 
carrot of equal rights in front of the noses of the colonized only to snatch it away. 
Indigenous Algerians were furious: French-Algerian relations were becoming 
dangerously heated. Already, it looked as if a peace between the two nations was 
unsalvageable.        
  If it were possible, the beginning of World War II in 1939 strained Franco-
Algerian relations even more. Again huge numbers of indigenous Algerians and pieds 
noirs fought on behalf of France, and again huge numbers lost their lives: in terms of 
military service, the situation remained the same. The situation also remained the same 
with regard to the overall lack of recognition that the native Algerian veterans received 
from the French government. De Gaulle did extend French citizenship to a limited 
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number of veterans and other Algerian Muslims in 1943110, but the majority received 
nothing more than accolades for their service: "As recompense, France had merely given 
them medals, war pendants, and government jobs. Many who had hoped to obtain French 
citizenship or at least equal rights with French Algerians were dismayed by this 
ingratitude."111  
 The lack of adequate recognition by the French government was like a slap in the 
face, and one they refused to endure any longer. The unrest came to a boiling point at the 
same time the war ended: "On May 8, 1945, the day the armistice was signed, Muslim 
Algerians paraded in most of the cities of Algeria, with banners bearing the slogan 'Down 
with fascism and colonialism.'"112 What had previously been mere demonstrations turned 
into full-on violent riots. Muslim Algerians were demanding change loudly, and 
miraculously--for the first time since 1830--the French government listened. As part of its 
decolonization effort, the government passed a bill in 1946 stating "All subjects of 
overseas territories, including Algeria, possess the quality of citizens with the same rights 
as French citizens in the home country and in the overseas territories."113 In the context of 
the nearly nonexistent rights of the past, this was quite a boon. And perhaps if it had been 
offered earlier, the native Algerians would have accepted it gladly. But as it were, it was 
simply too late: henceforth, it would be independence or nothing.  
   
 
 
                                                        
110
 Stora, 21 
111
 Gilles Martin, 52 
112
 Stora, 21 
113
 Luethy, 220 
 52 
IV. La Guerre Sans Nom: The Franco-Algerian War, 1954-1962 
 The Franco-Algerian War officially began on November 1st, 1954,114 but the 
violent attacks that would come to be characteristic of the war as a whole began long 
before. Algerian nationalists were the first to act, targeting pieds noirs, French, and other 
Europeans as early as 1950: "The rebellion broke out in Aurès, one of the most destitute 
regions in Algeria. Its beginnings were marked by subversive acts and the massacre of 
Europeans." These acts were accompanied by a swift and rallying call to action: "On 
November 1, 1950, the leaders of the rebellion issued an appeal to the Algerian people to 
combat colonialism."115 Algerian Muslims answered the call enthusiastically, responding 
to the nationalistic climate that was sweeping the country.  
 By 1954, what were in previous years several disparate rebel groups had 
consolidated into one centralized group called the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN). 
The group, described by Stora as "the sole heir to Algerian nationalism,"116 was extremist 
from the get-go. Its leaders used a combination of "propaganda and coercion"117 to gain 
support and incite nationalism among Muslim Algerians, who rallied behind the group 
swiftly and enthusiastically. In the beginning, the FLN seemed to them to be the 
embodiment of everything they had been pursuing: it demanded independence for 
Algeria, and it demanded it loudly. It combined a nationalistic ideal with a heavy-handed 
approach, two components that would be necessary in dealing with the French colonial 
giant. But the people were largely unprepared for the enormous breadth and scope of the 
violence that was to be unleashed on the French armies two years later.   
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 In the interim between the FLN's inception in 1954 and its first violent attacks in 
1956,118 the French government occupied itself with internal negotiations for which there 
was seemingly no end. What to do about the rebellion in Algeria? The government was 
sharply divided on the issue: "The prolongation of the war led to a debate in metropolitan 
France on the status of Algeria. The alternatives were integration, independence, or 
partition--each entailing radical changes."119 Each of the three courses of action 
represented a commitment that France was, as of yet, unwilling to make. The only thing 
government officials did agree on was that withdrawing from Algeria point-blank was out 
of the question. The two countries had simply been tied too closely for too long. After all, 
l'Algérie, c'était la France: Governor general Jacques Soustelle proclaimed that "France 
would no more leave Algeria than she would leave Provence or Brittany."120  
 Soustelle's statement places France's decision to stay in Algeria in a very moral 
framework, implying that France was so dedicated the Algerian cause that it would stick 
by the people even in times of hardship. This was decidedly not the case: France acted 
the way it did out of pure self-interest. Having an authoritarian and military presence in 
Algeria had been economically and strategically advantageous to France for decades, and 
the government was not interested in losing these advantages. There is the additional 
possibility that part of the reason why France was so invested in Algeria was due to the 
natural gas and oil reserves discovered in the Sahara in 1952: "The sizable investments in 
the Sahara were mentioned by some Frenchmen as a...reason for continuing the war."121 
Stora chimes in on this topic as well and even goes a step further, suggesting that the 
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expansive space of the Sahara gave the French a perfect place to test their nuclear 
weapons: "In the course of the war itself, the discovery of oil and the decision to use the 
vast Sahara for the first nuclear space experiments came to be added to...[the] 
rationale."122 It is unclear whether or not these factors played into the French 
government's thinking about Algeria, but the fact that prominent historians are suggesting 
it is significant: France was acting not out of humanitarian or fraternal loyalty to the 
Algerian people, but based on its own self-motivated interests.      
 For the time being, however, France's approach to the crisis in Algeria remained 
shaky. Clinging to the idea that reconciliation under their terms was still possible, the 
French government decided to pursue a policy of pacification: in 1955, "peacekeeping" 
troops were poured into Algeria by the thousands. This action was met with violent 
protest on the part of the French soldiers, many of whom had already spent years in 
Algeria with the French military and had since been recalled home: "On September 1, at 
the Gare de l'Est in Paris, two thousand young people refused to board trains, shouting 
'Civilian life!' 'No war in Algeria!'"123 These manifestations were indicative not only of 
the soldiers' anger and anxiety at being redeployed, but also of the presence of a general 
public opposition to the war as a whole.  
 The heightened French military presence had even more disastrous consequences 
on Algerian soil. The soldiers were increasingly repressive of the Algerian natives, 
behaving in brutally discriminatory ways on a regular basis. Wherever they went, they 
spread violence and destroyed Algerian villages.124 Any individual rights that had 
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previously been extended to Algerians were officially revoked, prompting large numbers 
of young Algerians to join with the FLN: "The repression pushed thousands of young 
Algerians toward the guerrilla forces (students in particular, who organized a strike in 
1956)."125 In February of the same year, the FLN decided it would abide the influx of 
troops and the repression of Algeria no longer: the first organized attacks on French 
soldiers, police forces, and pieds noirs took place in the city of Oran. On the French side, 
this meant complete and total chaos: for want of adequate training, the troops were fatally 
taken by surprise.126  
 After the initial strike, one thing became clear: if the French were to successfully 
maintain their stake in Algeria, they would need to up the ante. So it did just that: in 
response to the violence in Oran, the French government pumped still more troops into 
the heart of Algeria. "The extremist pieds noirs and the army demanded an increase in the 
number of soldiers, already 190,000 strong in February 1956."127 Accompanying this new 
wave of soldiers was a fleet of helicopters, sent to support the French military's newest 
and most drastic endeavor to date: the partitioning of the capital city of Algiers. They 
divided it cleanly into three "zones," each one designated for a different military 
operation and strategy: "In the zone of operation, the objective would be to 'crush the 
rebels.' In the pacification zones, the 'protection' of European and Muslim populations 
was foreseen...forbidden zones were to be evacuated, and the population assembled in 
'settlement camps' and placed under control of the army."128  
                                                        
125
 Stora, 48 
126
 Stora, 47 
127
 Stora, 46 
128
 Stora, 46 
 56 
 This was the first major manifestation of French military strategy on the ground in 
Algeria, and it was significant for several reasons. For one, it represented somewhat of a 
turning point in France's foreign policy in Algeria. Since the onset of the war, French 
government officials had been indecisive as to how to deal with the hostile rebel groups 
and the emerging FLN. Faced with a series of choices that were equally unappealing, the 
French had government pursued no definitive course of action beyond further 
"assimilation" of the Algerian people: "The attitude of the authorities in Algeria was that 
of a series of refusals amounting to a total denial of reality. The truth was unbearable 
because it was tragic. A choice had to be made between prolonging the war and granting 
independence."129 The partitioning of the city of Algiers made it clear which choice 
France had made. The French government had unequivocally refused to withdraw from 
the country, and the war would continue to wreak havoc on two continents for another six 
long years.    
 The partitioning of Algiers also had the effect of geographically refocusing both 
French military efforts and FLN-led attacks. For the remainder of the war, the majority of 
the violence was concentrated in the capital city: "The city became a permanent stage for 
latent violence, justified by social exploitation, combined with national oppression, and 
which manifested itself...in sudden outbreaks of open conflict."130 In January of 1957, the 
worst outbreak of "open conflict" yet was occurred at the hands of the FLN. A small 
group of FLN party members clandestinely planted bombs in two centrally located, 
popular bars in the heart of Algiers: "The horror reached its peak on January 26. Within a 
few minutes of each other, two charges exploded, the first in the bar L'Otomatic, the 
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second in the café Le Coq Hardi, in the very center of Algiers."131 Both the civilian death 
toll and the extent of the damage were unprecedented. The tragedy was absolute: the 
attacks (which feature prominently in Gillo Pontecorvo's 1966 film "La Bataille d'Alger") 
are demonstrative of the kind of violence and terrorism that the FLN engaged in on a 
regular basis. January 26th, 1957 would go down in history as one of the single most 
devastating dates of the Franco-Algerian War.  
 In the context of a discussion of FLN-perpetrated violence, it is of the utmost 
importance to emphasize that its severity and magnitude were entirely reciprocated by the 
French military forces. The chaos and turmoil in Algiers and elsewhere in the country 
provided soldiers and military officials with the opportunity to engage in unspeakable 
acts of violence, including the random physical harming and/or murder of Algerian 
civilians. Political assassinations were particularly prominent, and civilian deaths 
factored highly into these casualties: "[French military forces] arrested one hundred 
suspects and shot them on the spot. By the end of the week, well over a thousand 
Algerians, mostly civilians, lay dead, marking what Frantz Fanon later called 'the point of 
no return.'"132 Algerian women were targeted as well, enduring intense physical and 
emotional abuse: "The history that emerges in [these women's] texts confirms the 
physical and psychological abuse inflicted upon Algerian women combatants by the 
French military during the anti-colonial struggle."133 The trauma of this type of abuse still 
persists today, weighing heavily on the lives of the women that it impacts.     
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 The most shocking violence that occurred at the hands of the French, however, 
was yet to be fully discovered by the international community: the French military was 
torturing its Algerian political prisoners. Drawing on methods of torture that had been 
employed by the Nazis during World War II, the French government used a wide variety 
of inhumane, atrocious, and shameful tactics to extract information from those it held 
captive. Most often, the military was seeking information concerning the identities and 
whereabouts of FLN party leaders. The FLN's infrastructure was purposefully and 
carefully obscured from the French, so information about who was giving orders and 
where to find them was extremely valuable. So valuable, apparently, that the French 
military was willing to subject its prisoners to physical, psychological, and sexual torture 
until they got it.  
 This was not limited to a few, isolated incidents, but occurred continuously and on 
a regular basis: it was a fundamental part of French "military strategy" in Algeria. 
General Jacques Massu "conceded...that torture had systematically been carried out by 
the soldiers under his command, particularly during the 'Battle of Algiers.'"134 Massu was 
one individual who later expressed regret about his involvement in torture. In an 
interview with prominent French newspaper Le Monde, he stated that "Torture...isn't 
indispensable in times of war, and one can very well do without it. When I look back on 
Algeria, it saddens me...one could have done things differently."135 Not everyone who 
was implicated in torture, however, attempted to repent for it later. Paul Aussaresses, a 
French officer who himself had ordered and carried out torture, did just the opposite: "In 
a shameful book, Paul Aussaresses, who held the rank of major at the time, had the 
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audacity to take credit for, and actually revel in, his crimes."136 Aussaresses's comments 
(made public through the release of his memoirs) were met with moral outrage in France. 
How could it possibly be that the great République had engaged in such horrible, 
inhuman acts? If the government knew about it, why did they not put a stop to it?  
 This last question is especially apt, because the French government did in fact 
know about the torture that was going on in Algeria. As early as three years before the 
War even started, journalist Claude Bourdet wrote an article on the subject for 
L'Observateur that questioned the ethics of French interrogation practices in Algeria. In 
1955 he wrote a second article, which was expository in nature and which cited specific 
names of people who had been tortured.137 In 1960, Henri Alleg published a book that 
provided a first person account of his own torture in Algeria. The book, entitled La 
Question, "sold 60,000 copies in one day" and was subsequently "banned by the French 
police."138 Given the presence of these published and widely read accounts and 
allegations of torture, it is impossible that the French government did not know what was 
going on. But it continued to adamantly deny its involvement in torture for decades after 
the War's end.  
    It bears mentioning that there were a select few members of the French military 
forces who openly objected to the use of torture in Algeria. General Paris Bollardière is 
the most well-known of these men: "General Paris Bollardière resigned from his post in 
1957 on the grounds that the torturing of Algerian citizens contradicted everything he had 
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fought against during WWII. He was subsequently reprimanded and thrown in prison."139 
This example is both heartening and disheartening. On one hand, it proves that not all 
French soldiers were in favor of or indifferent to the use of torture in military practice: 
"Some of the torturers were sadists, to be sure. But many officers, noncommissioned 
officers, and soldiers would live with that nightmare for the rest of their lives."140 
Bollardière, who had the courage to stand up to something as immoral and inhumane as 
torture, should be commended. But the fact remains that the vast majority of the French 
military and the French government remained compliant, creating a deep scar that would 
send the entire country reeling for years to come.   
  What complicates the matter further is that the FLN, too, was involved in torture. 
It too contains party members who both ordered and participated in the torture of French 
and pied noir prisoners, and these individuals have had to go through their own process 
of coming to terms with what they did during the War. Did the FLN torture on the same 
level and with the same frequency that the French forces did? Probably not. And it is true 
that the FLN never would have come into existence if it were not for the decades of 
repression and marginalization that the French colonial power inflicted on Algeria's 
native population: "The FLN owed its birth, and much of its appeal, to a history of 
violent conquest, racial inequality, and colonial arrogance, during which the French 
brutally repressed any stirring of indigenous nationalism."141 Despite these facts, 
however, the torture and the terrorism that the FLN perpetuated remain unjustifiable. The 
practice of torture during the Franco-Algerian War remains a stain on both France and 
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Algeria. It is an intense and collective trauma that both countries are very much still 
grappling with today.   
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V.  Dans l'Ombre de Ses Crimes: The Challenges of the North African Immigrant in 
Postcolonial France, 1962-2000 
 In the wake of the Franco-Algerian War, France settled into a deep silence. The 
atrocities that had been committed were just too horrible to face while the wounds were 
still raw. Victims of torture and perpetrators of torture simply tucked their experiences 
away, burying the trauma of what they had lived deep within the vaults of a collective 
cultural memory. It would be an astonishing thirty-seven years before the French 
parliament even acknowledged that there had been a war in Algeria. When they had to 
refer to the war at all, they used epithets: "After the French defeat, the Algerian war was 
referred to as 'the war without a name' [la guerre sans nom], or, even more obliquely, as 
'the events' ['les évenements]."142 The act of overtly naming the Franco-Algerian War 
would have allowed it to take on a power and an immediacy that French society was not 
ready to cope with.  
  This unspoken trauma had strong, far-reaching impacts for those immigrating to 
France in the late 1900s. Immediately following the war, there was an influx of migration 
(both refugees and voluntary migrants) from Algeria itself. A mixture of native Algerian 
refugees, pieds noirs, and harkis143 arrived on French soil: "In a matter of weeks, a 
million forlorn refugees (two percent of the French population in 1962) arrived in 
southern France."144 As Gilles Martin points out, the number of refugees was astounding, 
accounting for a full two percent of the entire French population at the time. Because of 
the sheer number of Algerian migrants, it was impossible for the French people to simply 
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ignore them: they were there, in French communities, looking to rebuild their war-torn 
lives and start anew. Some kind of assimilation was clearly necessary. But this was much 
easier said than done. How could the French people, shocked into silence by the events of 
the war, arrive at a place where assimilation would be at all possible? And how could the 
pieds noirs and other Algerian migrants, who had been "driven from the only home that 
most of them had ever known," manage to surmount the "acute sense of betrayal"145 that 
they felt so deeply?  
 The difficulty of assimilating inhabitants of former French colonies had been 
predicted long before these migrants began to arrive in France. Gustave LeBon spoke of 
the impossibility of assimilating indigenous populations as early as the 1870s: "'Two 
races so dissimilar,' he wrote, 'could never live in peace on the same soil.'"146 19th 
century racial hierarchy theories placed the indigenous people of colonized countries far 
below the "purebred" white, Christian Europeans, creating a perception of French 
superiority that never seemed to dispel: "Racial stereotypes in which these differences 
were often expressed found an unusual virulence when used to describe colonial 
subjects."147 As such, Algerian, Tunisian, Moroccan, and Malian immigrants (among 
others) were confronted with racism and discrimination in France on a regular basis. 
Hampered by stereotypes that held that Arab Muslims were lazy, incompetent, and 
degenerate, it was often difficult for them to find jobs or pursue an education: 
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"Immigrants and their children tended to be excluded from the usual French route to 
social advancement."148  
 The way that housing was set up by the State also contributed heavily to the social 
exclusion that immigrants faced. The end of World War II in 1945 and the end of the 
Franco-Algerian War in 1962 gave way to large numbers of migrants who wished to 
come live and work in France, which was problematic for one important reason: there 
were not enough accommodations available for them. The need for more low-income 
housing quickly became apparent, and the government set about constructing hostels and 
low-income apartments (widely known today as HLM149): "In the 1950s [and 1960s] the 
state built hostels and low-rent apartments for single workers near factories and away 
from city centers, a decision that was intended to...tightly link immigration to specific 
labor needs."150 The idea behind this housing design was that single male workers who 
immigrated to France for labor purposes would be able to afford a room or an apartment 
while still maintaining proximity to the workplace.   
 For a while, this system functioned reasonably well. Single male workers lived 
either in hostels (designated "immigrant housing") or in small HLM apartments located 
near their place of employment. Some of these migrants stayed in France for long periods 
of time, while others came, completed work, and then promptly returned to their home 
countries. But by the 1960s, the mentality of migrant workers was changing. Drawn to 
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what was, for most migrants, a more developed society and an overall higher standard of 
living, they decided to stay in France permanently. Many foreign laborers also had 
families that they aspired to bring to over in the future using a family reunification visa. 
Living in France afforded migrant families economic opportunities that were not 
available in their home countries, and parents wanted to provide their children with the 
best life that they could give.  
  One byproduct of this decision to settle in France permanently was that the 
housing the government had built (and continued to build throughout the late 1900s) was 
insufficient in a variety of ways. For one, the HLM apartments were extremely cramped. 
They had been constructed with the occupancy of one single male worker in mind, so 
fitting entire families into an apartment was quite a feat. They were also extremely 
inconveniently located: "Following the modernist style of the day, projects were built as 
separated islands of 500 or more apartments, often far from public transportation."151 
HLM apartments were usually built on the outskirts of major cities (Paris, Lyon, 
Marseille, and in the Alsace and Mosel regions152), and as such were isolated from the 
heart of urban social life.  
 This physical isolation is a manifestation of the kind of social exclusion that North 
African immigrants faced (and continue to face) in France. Most could not afford their 
own vehicle, so without easy access to public transportation, migrants had no way of 
accessing the cultural resources available to them in more central parts of the city. Their 
geographic isolation also effectively limited or prevented them from forming any kind of 
social network outside of their immediate environments (workplace and the HLM 
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apartment complex), creating conditions that gave rise to widespread loneliness and 
depression. Most migrants maintained close ties with relatives and friends in their 
countries of origin as a way of combating these feelings, making frequent phone calls and 
sending mail. Those who could afford it made periodic visits back to their home 
countries, returning to France out of financial necessity of because their visas or 
residence permits stipulated that they had to.   
    By the 1980s, the first generation of North African migrants had given way to a 
second generation. Born on French soil to immigrant parents,153 these "second 
generation" children faced a whole slew of social, economic, and personal difficulties. As 
author and professor Mireille Rosello points out, the challenges that this second 
generation faced--and also the advantages they possessed--were distinct from those of 
their parents: "By the 1980s, the single male migrant worker of the 1950s and 1960s had 
been replaced by a whole generation...whose relationship to France, to French culture, 
and to French laws needed to be rearticulated."154 Unlike their parents, this second 
generation possessed legal French citizenship. They were born in France, raised in 
France, and educated in French schools. They spoke the language fluently whereas their 
parents, in many cases, did not. Based on these facts alone, it would seem that the second 
generation had an easier time functioning and achieving upward mobility in French 
society than did their parents.  
 This, however, was quite decidedly not the case. While a command of the French 
language and a more thorough knowledge of French society and culture were both 
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significant advantages for the second generation, they encountered an entirely new set of 
biases and challenges that were specific to their time period. Unemployment was one of 
these challenges. Generally speaking, the waves of chômage in France were a structural 
problem that affected everyone. It had been nearly thirty full years since the end of World 
War II, so the country was no longer in need of a body of foreign labor to help with 
rebuilding efforts. Women were also getting more involved in the workplace, and the 
postwar baby-boom generation was coming of age right around the 1980s.155 All of these 
circumstances paved the way for high rates of unemployment for second-generation 
children of immigrant parents.  
 This structural explanation is all well and good, and it is certainly not inaccurate. 
But the heart of the problem, and the reason why unemployment hit children North 
African immigrants harder than any other population, was unadulterated discrimination 
and racial profiling. Employers made pre-judgments about non-white job candidates on a 
regular basis, automatically shifting (whether literally or figuratively) the applications of 
persons of color to the bottom of the pile. Non-whiteness was associated with non-
Frenchness, and the quality of being native French  (français de souche) was a quality 
that was increasingly valued above all others. This applied not only to the workplace, but 
to the larger French social environment as well. Skin color was constantly being used as a 
barometer for character, placing non-white children of immigrants at a continuous social 
disadvantage and barring them from a variety of different kinds of success from a very 
young age. If one was not white and born in France of native French parents, one was 
almost certain to be pre-judged and misconstrued.  
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 Second-generation children of immigrants also had to grapple with what were 
often conflicting expectations and desires from their parents' end. Being first-generation 
immigrants themselves, parents had various degrees of immersion in French society. 
Some (mainly those whose country of origin was a former French colony) spoke French 
fluently and held decently paying jobs. They maintained a high degree of contact with 
society and were thus up to date on contemporary trends, mores, and social knowhow. 
The children of these immigrant parents belonged to more privileged milieus and usually 
encountered very little cultural identity-related conflict at home. This group of parents, 
however, was a very small minority, and was not at all representative of most first-
generation immigrants' situations. The majority spoke imperfect or broken French, and 
many were functionally or completely illiterate (analphabètes). They held menial jobs 
(housecleaning, janitorial work, etc.) that paid meager wages, lived in deplorable 
conditions, and generally struggled to get by on a day-to-day basis.  
 It is the children of this group of first-generation immigrants who faced--and who 
continue to face--a set of profound familial tensions at home. France has, in many senses 
of the word, been extremely cruel to the parents, breeding an acute sense of resentment 
that leads them to reject involvement with the greater French society. Quite 
understandably, they cling to cultural customs from their countries of origin, passing on 
their native language, values, and practices to their children. Today, this results in a sort 
of juggling act for the second-generation child: at home, he or she speaks a language that 
is not French and speaks and acts according to the customs of the parents' native culture. 
In public life, on the other hand--at school, with friends, in stores and public venues--he 
or she is a fully functioning French citizen. This involvement in what are essentially two 
 69 
entirely different worlds has some very real implications for the child's own sense of 
cultural and personal identity. In one sense, both of these identities belong to the child. 
He or she is technically French, but grew up speaking a language that was not French, 
and observed different cultural customs in the domestic space. This renders the parents' 
native culture an equally fundamental part of his or her identity.  
 In another, opposite (yet equally true) sense, the children of immigrant parents feel 
that they can lay claim to neither of these two identities. They feel themselves to be 
caught between two cultures, and are never able to fully identify a hundred percent with 
one or the other: "The children of North African immigrants are often held responsible 
for the success or failure of cultural exchange or cohabitation: they are seen as mediators, 
as go-betweens, whose seemingly natural function is to occupy the no man's land between 
the perpetual host and the eternal guest."156 Because of this sense of "stuckness," it is not 
uncommon for second-generation children feel an intense sense of resentment towards 
France that is akin to the resentment their parents feel. They are perceived as second-rate 
citizens and afforded fewer rights and opportunities than their peers who are born of 
native French parents.  
 Mehdi Charef's157 1983 novel Le Thé au Harem (Tea in the Harem) treats this 
sense of resentment, anger, and frustration extensively, taking as its protagonist a second-
generation child of immigrant parents named Majid. The book jacket reads as follows: "A 
housing estate in the Paris suburbs. Majid is growing up caught between two cultures. At 
home; he listens to his mother's constant invective in Arabic as she attempts to make 
                                                        
156
 Rosello, 90 
157
 Mehdi Charef is himself a child of immigrant parents, born in Algeria in 1952 and 
brought to France under a family reunification visa in 1964.    
 70 
sense of her new surroundings; at school he tries to be part of French culture, a culture 
that rejects and insults Arabs."158 Charef's novel and the publication of others like it in 
the 1980s and 1990s can be seen as a mechanism for challenging the social injustices that 
immigrants in France are facing. He is spreading awareness while at the same time 
offering commentary on a situation of which he himself has firsthand knowledge, 
constituting an important contribution to French cultural consciousness. Novels like Le 
Thé au Harem matter a lot, precisely because they represent a voice that is seldom heard 
in French society.    
 Literature also provides a space for exploring multiple facets of personal and 
cultural identity that France does not allow for in the public sphere.  
The abstract, universalist notion of French national identity leaves very little wiggle room 
for identification with multiple cultures, which is intensely problematic for immigrants 
and children of immigrants. French Republican principles insist that the notion of the 
homogeneous, abstract French "citizen" is the basis for equality. But the needs of second-
generation children of immigrants mandate a more concrete, more holistic interpretation 
of identity: "The defenders of the abstract mode argue that it alone guarantees universal 
equality; the defenders of the concrete mode do not reject universalism but think equality 
is achieved by addressing rather than ignoring social distinctions."159 This tension 
between the abstract and concrete modes of representation is at the very heart of the 
experience of immigrant populations in France. How is it finally possible to call oneself a 
citizen of a country whose notion of citizenship excludes fundamental and defining 
aspects of one's personal identity?  
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 These kinds of questions about immigration, representation, and French national 
identity became increasingly politicized in the 1990s. The most direct manifestation of 
this politicization was legislation: two major laws concerning European national identity 
and the movement of peoples were put in effect in 1992 and 1995, respectively. The first 
of these was the Maastricht Treaty (Traité de Maastricht), which is notable mainly from a 
symbolic standpoint. Before 1992, the collection of (mostly Western European) countries 
now known as the European Union was referred to as the European Community, or the 
EC. Under the Maastricht Treaty, the name was changed, officially establishing the 
European Union of today.160 This was of course a legal unification, but it was also a 
symbolic one, reflective of the individual countries' desire to become part of a singular, 
united community that had more power and a heightened standard of living. Just three 
years later in 1995, the Schengen Agreements were implemented, which would 
henceforth allow members of the European Union to move freely across national borders 
without a passport.161 Allowing for this kind of internal mobility within the European 
Union effectively reinforced what the Maastricht Treaty had begun. The EU became a 
united and powerful conglomerate community, in practice and in theory.  
 The consolidation of the European Union had important implications for 
immigration. Both the Maastricht Treaty and the Schengen Agreements resulted in a 
redefinition of borders, eliminating them on the inside and erecting them on the outside. 
The European Union became an effectual "fortress," allowing its inhabitants complete 
internal mobility while at the same time discouraging access from the outside: "The 
Schengen agreements contributed to the creation of fortress Europe, whose philosophical 
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(and therefore political and practical) goal was increased freedom within the Schengen 
bloc and reinforced control on the supranational border line."162 So its motivations were 
twofold: to facilitate circulation of goods and people internally, and to heighten security 
externally. In her book entitled Postcolonial Hospitality: The Immigrant as Guest, 
Rosello discusses the way in which this legislation can be perceived as hostile to non-EU 
members: "Europe is constantly stressing the concept of 'freedom of movement' within its 
redefined borders, which means increasing controls on the outskirts of its new symbolic 
territory, in a general atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion that treats all non-
Europeans...as potentially undesirable parasites."163 In this way, the Maastricht Treaty 
and the Schengen Agreements, though not overtly concerned with immigration, can be 
perceived as hostile to the process. 
 A third piece of legislation, however, was overtly hostile to the immigration 
process. The Pasqua Laws of 1993 (named after French Ministère de l'Intérieur Charles 
Pasqua) restricted immigration in a variety of ways: it "prohibit[ed] foreign graduates 
from accepting job offers by French employers and den[ied] them a stable residence 
status," "increas[ed] the waiting period for family reunification from one to two years,"  
and "den[ied] residency permits to foreign spouses who had been illegally in the country 
prior to marrying."164 The Pasqua Laws, some of the most repressive anti-immigration 
measures ever to be implemented in France, constituted a drastic shift in French 
immigration policy: "The so-called Pasqua laws became the most obvious manifestation 
of the French government's anti-immigration attitude. They reflected an increasingly 
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repressive and restrictive philosophy, turning the clandestin (illegal immigrant) into an 
enemy of the state, the most easily identifiable national scapegoat." The laws delivered 
the message loud and clear: France was not only no longer favorable to immigration; it 
was actively discouraging it with definitive legal measures.  
 The Laws also had far-reaching effects for migrants whose means to a residency 
permit had been negated in the process: "These repressive measures rendered formerly 
legal migration flows illegal. Thus today...there are still many people living in France 
known as inexpulsables-irrégularisables. This group...cannot be expelled, yet it not 
eligible for residency permits."165 This is yet another group of people living within 
France's borders that has found itself between cultural identities. Since they were legal 
migrants to begin with, they cannot be formally asked to return to their countries of 
origin. So they continue to live in a country that will never extend them citizenship 
rights. Even if they speak flawless, beautiful French and are highly involved in their 
communities--even if they are in all ways indistinguishable from the "native French" 
among whom they live--they will never be able to identify themselves as legal French 
citizens.     
 This shift in French immigration policy has its roots in a broader political context; 
namely, the rise of the far right political party the Front National. Born of the postwar 
neo-fascist group Ordre Nouveau, the Front National (or National Front, as it is called in 
English) officially appeared on the French political scene in 1972. It did not gain much of 
a following until the late 1970s, when Jean-Marie Le Pen gave the party a complete 
                                                        
165
 Virginie Guiraudon. "Immigration Policy in France."  
 74 
"ideological and organizational renewal."166 Le Pen's name has been inextricably linked 
with the party every since. The Front National enjoyed a particular surge in popularity in 
the early 90s, when the increased North African and Muslim presence in France brought 
the party's anti-immigration campaign to the forefront.  
 Anti-immigration and nationalism have always been hallmarks of the far right, but 
Le Pen was able to frame the specific "issue" of immigration in a way that capitalized on 
French anxieties about their increasingly multi-racial, pluralistic society: "Immigration 
[became] a sort of shorthand for a complex pattern of concerns--the fear of 
unemployment, of housing problems, rising crime, AIDS, drug abuse, and uncertainties 
about France's place in the world and the meaning of what it is to be French."167 Even 
though major migration flows to France had slowed considerably by the 1990s, postwar 
North African immigrants were very present in French society. Because the majority of 
these migrants were a) black, b) Arab, and/or c) Muslim, they made much of the "native" 
French population uneasy: "Immigration, in this populist view, was presented as a rising 
tide of mainly North African and Muslim faces."168 
 Some simply did not know how to go about reconciling these racial and religious 
differences with traditional French values, while others (like Le Pen) were simply 
unwilling to try. The Front National's ingenious solution was to stem immigration flows 
altogether: "Politicians...responded by arguing in favor of 'immigration zéro," and the 
right-wing coalition that came into power in 1993 translated the principle of zero 
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immigration into policy."169 The policies that eventually resulted were the 1993 Pasqua 
Laws, a testament to how influential Le Pen and the Front National could be. By pointing 
a finger at immigration, Le Pen was feeding off a powerful set of anxieties that had 
already begun to formulate in French society. The discourse of the Front National was 
thus a major turning point in the political redefinition of immigration in the 1990s. The 
immigration zéro movement established a powerful precedent for thinking about 
immigration in a strictly political context, at the exclusion of all other frameworks or 
contexts in which it could be considered. As Rosello states, "When the analogy between 
the guest and the immigrant means that the individual is supposed to take it for granted 
that his or her own foreign guests are undesirable parasites, then it becomes urgent to 
point out that...the choice of the metaphor is subjected to political agendas."170 To this 
day, France has been largely unable to recover these alternative frameworks: immigration 
remains principally a political issue in the public eye.    
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VI. Les Années Explosives: The Headscarf Affair and Banlieue Violence, 2000-2012  
 The politicization of immigration in France was, partly, what allowed a set of 
virulent clashes to develop in the early 2000s. One was ideological while the other was 
physical, but they both had an extremely strong impact on French national identity and 
France's interpretation and perception of immigration in a modern context.  
 The first was, in effect, a clash between the growing presence of Muslims in 
France and French notion of secularism. Throughout the postcolonial period, the number 
of Muslims in France had been steadily increasing. Most Muslim immigrants hailed from 
the North African countries of Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco, but a sizeable number 
came to the métropole from French territories like Mayotte and La Réunion.171 As early as 
the 1980's, the Muslim presence in French society (as well as the North African 
immigrant presence more generally) began to cause anxiety among the native French 
people. They were unused to being surrounded by so much racial and religious 
difference, and they felt that their own French national identity was being threatened in 
the face of so much change: "Politicians, public intellectuals, and the media responded to 
the fact of a growing population of Muslim 'immigrants' in their midst--immigrants 
whose diversities were reduced to a single difference that was then taken to be a threat to 
the very identity of the nation."172  
 This anxiety ultimately manifested itself as a preoccupation with the wearing of 
the Islamic headscarf, or hijab. In 1989, three young girls were asked to remove their 
headscarves in the halls of their public middle school in Creil (an impoverished Parisian 
suburb). The girls refused, and were promptly expelled from the school on the grounds 
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that they had failed to uphold laïcité (the French version of secularism).173 Being the first 
of its kind, this event quickly spiraled into the media: "What would at other times have 
been a minor incident--a school principal disciplining a few of his students--quickly 
became a major media event, tapping into, and at the same time inflaming, public 
uneasiness about the place of North African immigrants and their children in French 
society."174 The principal's decision became so controversial that it was presented to the 
Conseil d'Etat for consideration a month later. After a short while, the court reached a 
decision regarding the matter: "The wearing of signs of religious affiliation by students in 
public schools was not necessarily incompatible with the principle of laïcité, as long as 
these signs were not ostentatious or polemic...[and did not interfere] with the liberties of 
other students."175   
 Public interest and media commentary upon the affair calmed down after the 
decision was reached, but France had not seen the last of the "headscarf affair." In 1994, 
right-wing politician Eugène Chénier stirred the pot again when he proposed a bill that 
would "ban all 'ostentatious' signs of religious affiliation." He campaigned so 
convincingly for the bill that the minister of education, François Bayrou, eventually 
signed on: "François Bayrou decreed on September 20, 1994 that 'ostentatious' signs of 
religious affiliation would henceforth be prohibited in all schools."176 This decision was 
again presented to the Conseil d'Etat, and (based on the 1989 ruling) it was again 
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overturned. But the seeds of discontentment had been officially planted, and the tension 
between laïcité and the wearing of the headscarf in public schools continued to attract 
public attention.177   
  On March 15th, 2004, the government passed a law that banned young women 
and girls from wearing the headscarf in public schools definitively.     
The language used was as follows: "In public elementary, middle and high schools, the 
wearing of signs or clothing which conspicuously manifest students' religious affiliations 
is prohibited."178 Technically, the law applies to religious symbols in a general sense. But 
in light of the ongoing controversy about the headscarf and laïcité in public schools, there 
was little doubt that it was directed primarily at Muslim students. 
 The passage of this law elicited immediate, violent reactions from the national 
press, the international press, and the general public. Some believed that laïcité should be 
enforced at all costs, and thus supported the government's decision. Others maintained 
that banning the headscarf was discriminatory and unjust for Muslims, and that it 
eliminated what could have been a lesson in open-mindedness and diversity for non-
Muslim students. Still others believed that the government's energy had been misdirected 
altogether, and that it continued to shy away from the real issues at hand. Wassyla 
Tamzali suggests that policymakers should have focused more on the individual women 
and girls in question rather than the impersonal, highly politicized relationship between 
the headscarf and laïcité: "The French National Assembly preferred to open a national 
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debate about laïcité, and as such lost an occasion to confront head-on...the question of the 
equality of the sexes in France."179 
 Tamzali's idea is an interesting one because it gets at the heart of the kind of 
"scapegoating" that has become common in the French government's treatment of 
immigration in the past decade. The debate about the banning of the headscarf in public 
schools still persist in today's France, and many writers and researchers attribute this 
ongoing preoccupation to a set of deeply-rooted societal (and indeed, global) anxieties 
that have not yet been dealt with. Bowen asserts that "Anxieties about security and 
integration underlie the series of state efforts to manage Islam,"180 and Wallach Scott 
corroborates this statement: "Events in Iran, Israel/Palestine, Algeria, New York City, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq certainly contributed to anxiety about the place of Muslims in 
France."181 In other words, the "headscarf affair" is actually about a lot more than just 
headscarves. Global events such as 9/11 have permanently linked Islam with terrorism in 
the minds of many, and constant talk about national security and the division between the 
West and the East only serves to fuel anti-Muslim sentiment: "The radical acts of a few 
politically inspired Islamists have become a declaration of the intent of many; the 
religious practices of minorities have been taken to stand for the 'culture' of the whole."182 
France's desire to eliminate Islamic religious symbols in the public sphere can thus be 
viewed as a manifestation of these kinds of fundamental societal and global anxieties.   
 Wallach Scott takes the argument even further, proposing that past anxieties also 
play into the overwhelming interest in the "headscarf affair." She suggests that a French 
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fear of Islam is part of the Franco-Algerian War heritage, and that today's disapproval of 
the headscarf is linked to acts of terrorism carried out by the FLN during the War: "By 
1958, the FLN was using veiled women to transport weapons and bombs past security 
checkpoints, so unveiling women was a way of depriving the rebels of a convenient 
disguise."183 Memories of the all-out massacre that was the Franco-Algerian War continue 
to weigh heavily on the French nation, so Wallach Scott's argument is compelling. It is 
perfectly plausible that the French people would have an unconscious association 
between the headscarf and terrorism established in their minds, which would account for 
the government's ardent desire to eliminate the headscarf in public schools. 
 It was exactly these kinds of anxieties within the national body that sparked a 
series of violent conflicts between French police and banlieue youth in November of 
2005. It all began in Clichy-Sous-Bois, a particularly derelict and impoverished Parisian 
banlieue with a high migrant population. While patrolling the area, French police stopped 
to ask a group of young men of color for their cartes d'identité (ID cards). Afraid of 
police harassment, the young men fled, and the officers followed close behind. The chase 
ended abruptly when two of the men were electrocuted to death after seeking refuge in an 
electric transformer. When news of the deaths became public, the banlieue went wild 
with anger: "When two of [the men]--of Mauritanian and Tunisian origin, respectively--
died there by accidental electrocution, many in the banlieues were quick to blame their 
deaths on aggressive policing and took to the streets to demonstrate their anger."184 Bands 
of teenagers and young adults threw projectiles and burned cars, police stations, and other 
public buildings. Police officers responded brutally, wielding batons and spraying tear 
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gas to disperse the riot. As newspaper headlines around the world would proclaim in days 
to come, France was burning.  
  The riots in the Parisian banlieues continued for nearly a month. Things got so 
bad that Jacques Chirac's government declared a state of emergency, invoking a law that 
had been inactive for a full fifty years: "Chirac's government...declared a state of 
emergency, using a 1955 law passed during France's colonial war in Algeria that permits 
the imposition of a curfew and suspension of civil liberties, including those of the press, 
and permits detention without trial, the use of military tribunals and bans on public 
meetings."185 When the chaos died down, the Republic found itself face-to-face with 
some very difficult questions. There was clearly pent-up animosity and tension between 
French police officers and the youth in the banlieue, but how and why did the tension 
come to a breaking point in the way it did?  
  According to Michel Wieviorka, the answer is twofold. In his book entitled 
Violence en France, Wieviorka distinguishes between two different types of violence. 
The first, violence physique, is physical violence. This is violence in its most basic sense: 
hitting, kicking, breaking things, throwing projectiles, etc., and these are the actions that 
the word "violence" most readily connotes. The second type of violence is violence 
symbolique, or symbolic violence. This can take a wide variety of forms: spoken or 
written comments, deprivation of rights, stereotypes, or any other non-physical form of 
racism or general discrimination. It is this type of violence that Wieviorka most closely 
associates with the experience of banlieue youth: "The banlieue youth who break into 
riots or who are carried by hate or rage constantly define themselves according to the 
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symbolic violence they endure; the contempt, the negation of their person which first and 
foremost constitutes racism and social discrimination."186  
 Wieviorka's quote reveals the way in which symbolic violence tends to eventually 
give way to physical violence. Enduring intense discrimination or marginalization on a 
regular basis causes anger and resentment to build up over time, and it continues to build 
and build until one day the individual can take it no longer. The internalized feelings the 
individual has been holding in then spill over into an externalized rage, which often takes 
the form of physical violence. This was exactly what happened with the banlieue youth 
during the November 2005 riots in Clichy-Sous-Bois. The combination of a lifetime of 
geographical isolation, religious and racial discrimination, and meager opportunities for 
advancement was the symbolic violence they suffered, and they bore its weight until they 
could bear it no longer: "The behaviors of youth urban violence are the product of a 
refused recognition of the unbearable conviction that society is closed...here, violence 
indicates the desire to modify a situation that has become intolerable."187  
 During the 2005 riots, French police officers were the most obvious targets of this 
violence. But they were not the sole targets, and the fact that youth violence was also 
directed elsewhere is telling. In addition to police officers' physical person, rioters 
targeted police cars and other public, government-sanctioned spaces. Banks and post 
offices, for instance, were targeted because of their close affiliation with the State. So, 
for the purposes of the rioters, police officers were merely symbolic. As living, breathing 
representatives of State power, the gendarmes were easy objects upon which banlieue 
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youth could take out their anger and frustration: the problem they were having was not 
solely with the cops, but with the French nation itself.             
 The way that then-Ministre de l'Intérieur Nicolas Sarkozy spoke about the youth 
involved in the riots made the problem even worse, if that were indeed possible. He 
publicly described the rioters as "racaille," which roughly translates to the word "scum" 
in English. Many of the youth participating in the banlieue riots were children of 
immigrants or immigrants themselves, so Sarkozy's language can be seen as directly 
inflammatory on a number of social fronts, and the comment caused quite a bit of public 
outrage when it was first made. The term was so offensive, in fact, that Sarkozy was 
asked to retract the comment on numerous occasions: "Pressed repeatedly to retract the 
term racaille, Sarkozy declined numerous opportunities to do so...Instead, he stated, 
'Voyous ou racailles, je persiste et signe' ['Hoodlums or Scum, I stand by every 
word']."188 Sarkozy's comments are a perfect example of the kind of symbolic violence 
that gave rise to the 2005 riots in the first place. Hearing oneself being grouped with the 
"hoodlums" and "scum" of the banlieue only heightens one's sense of anger and 
indignation at the exclusion one faces, so by making inflammatory comments Sarkozy is 
only exacerbating the very situation he seeks to resolve.    
   Neither this controversy nor the headscarf controversy has been put to rest in 
today's France. The French Muslim population is higher than ever ("Paris proper is 10-15 
percent Muslim, Marseille 25 percent, and Roubaix, near Lille, 50 percent"189), but 
despite these statistics Muslims in France continue to be marginalized. The French 
government continues to hide behind the principle of laïcité to justify the banning of the 
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headscarf in public schools, and Islam--regardless of sect or ideology--continues to carry 
a stigma. Unrest in French banlieues has persisted, resurfacing most notably in 2008 and 
flaring up marginally in the years that followed. The solution that the French government 
has pursued thus far for both French Muslims and banlieue youth is "integration," but 
even this term begs some critical thinking and analysis. The government must give 
further serious consideration to the question of how to move forward in order to best 
incorporate these groups, because for now, first, second, and third-generation Muslim 
migrants and youth living in the banlieue remain firmly on the margins of the French 
society that they try continuously to access.  
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Comment Procéder? Integration Policy, Terminology, and Collective Memory: A 
Conclusion in Three Parts 
i. Integration Policy 
 Through the re-writing of the European Constitution, the Amsterdam Treaty of 
1997 mandated that all European Union member states develop more sophisticated 
immigration and integration policies.190 Immigration policies were nothing new, but 
integration policies were, as of yet, practically unheard of. So each country set about 
crafting its own integration policy, designed to provide migrants with avenues by which 
they could attain a higher level of cultural proficiency than they arrived with.  
 France implemented an integration policy that requires a variety of different steps: 
first, all migrants must sign a Reception and Integration Contract (CAI: contrat d'accueil 
et d'intégration) upon arrival. They must then attend a mandatory half-day Welcome 
Session (plate-forme d'accueil) and a full day of Civic Training (Formation Civique). 
Depending on their level of cultural proficiency, some must also attend a full day session 
providing information about living in France (Session d'Information Vivre en France). If 
the migrant is determined to be professional between the ages of 18 and 55, he or she 
must attend a Skills Assessment (Bilan de compétences). Finally, all migrants must attend 
language-training courses until they have achieved a level A1.1 according to the Common 
European Framework of Reference.191         
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 All of this was, doubtless, a step in the right direction. Hundreds of thousands of 
migrants arrive in host countries in the European Union every day, but huge numbers of 
these migrants do not speak the language and are completely unfamiliar with their new 
country's cultural customs. Barred by both their literacy level and their lack of access to 
computers, migrants have done various degrees of research on basic things like climate, 
dress, and diet. Some--particularly refugees who are forced to leave their home country in 
a hurry--have done no planning at all, and show up in countries like France without even 
a jacket to keep them warm in the wintertime. Because of all of these factors, integration 
programs are indispensable: they allow the migrant to attain a functional level of cultural 
proficiency, and the migrant in turn becomes more of an asset to the state.  
 This exchange presupposes a model in which immigration is framed as a reciprocal 
process: the migrant benefits from the host country and the host country benefits from the 
migrant. In order to have this happen, however, the integration programs must be tailored 
to fit migrants' needs. They must be sufficiently clear and straightforward so as to allow 
all language levels to benefit from their offerings, and the information they impart must 
be chosen very carefully by the state. Unfortunately, this is not always the case. The 
countries in the European Union dispose of integration policies that are in various stages 
of completion, even today. Countries that have had historically low rates of immigration, 
like Spain, use very loosely based, decentralized integration programs that vary from 
region to region, while countries like France impose integration requirements that are 
much more structured and much more involved.  
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 Even these more sophisticated integration programs contain deficiencies that need 
to be addressed. Le Sécrétariat Général à l'Immigration et à l'Intégration, under the 
auspices of the Ministère de l'intérieur, is the government agency responsible for 
devising and furnishing integration materials for migrants arriving in France. Among 
these materials are PowerPoint presentations, videos, booklets, pamphlets, and other 
handouts containing information about the France's demographics, its history, and its 
values (to name a few elements). After producing these materials, the ministry (in 
conjunction with l'OFII, l'Office Française de l'Immigration et de l'Intégration) arranges 
a variety of trainings (formations) at which these materials are disseminated to the 
migrants in attendance.  
 During the summer of 2011, the materials the Ministère was using to help migrants 
complete these mandatory trainings were sorely lacking. The PowerPoint presentation 
(the main feature at both the Formation Civique and the Formation Vivre en France) 
contained information regarding important legal processes for migrants that was out of 
date and therefore incorrect. The formatrice, or trainer, was unaware that she was 
presenting incorrect information and proceeded with her training as usual. The 
presentations were conducted entirely in French save for the presence of a single 
translator, who translated into one alternative language. The alternative language was not 
necessarily the native language of all migrants in attendance, but the Ministère and l'OFII 
tried as best they could to pair like groups of migrants with the appropriate translators. 
This meant that if large numbers of (for example) Russian-speaking migrants happened to 
attend the same training, they would be assigned a Russian translator. But if a couple of 
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native Persian speakers whose French wasn't up to par found themselves among that 
group, they were essentially out of luck.  
 Adequate secondary materials such as notepaper and pens were also inconsistently 
distributed to migrants during the trainings. Both trainings are designed to last a full day, 
so there are large amounts of important information being presented to those in 
attendance. Some of the contact numbers, agencies, and resources listed on the 
PowerPoint slides are absolutely indispensable to migrants, as they provide links to 
information about things like public education, taxes, housing, and the recognition of 
foreign qualifications. Given the sheer volume of what is being communicated, it is 
entirely impossible for the government to expect that migrants remember it all without 
being able to take notes, especially given that not all migrants possess a working 
knowledge of French. The absence of explanatory reference sheets or "Word Banks" with 
regards to the various titles and acronyms of the agencies and offices being mentioned 
was also striking. France is (at least, comparatively) an extremely bureaucratic country, 
and it is highly difficult for migrants coming in from the outside to understand the 
structures of the various organisms to which they must submit paperwork or 
documentation in order to get their new lives started. They have no idea what l'ADIL192 
or l'AFPA193 are, and without some kind of a guide to explain it, chances are they are 
missing out on some very important information.  
 To facilitate comprehension, the French government should provide adequate 
writing materials (pen, notepaper, and a clipboards) at each and every training to every 
migrant in attendance. A reference sheet detailing the contact information that is listed on 
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the slideshows should also be distributed, with explanations as to what the purpose of 
each agency is and how it can help the migrant further his or her goals. These sheets 
could be translated into a multiplicity of different languages and kept permanently on 
file, allowing migrants to walk into the training and select whichever translation best 
meets their language needs. Trainers (formateurs and formatrices) should be kept up-to-
date on changing government policies that would affect the accuracy of the information 
being delivered, and educational materials should be updated regularly so as to avoid 
confusion. Doing all of these things would go a long way in making the actual integration 
process in France more effective.   
 
ii. Terminology: "Integration" vs. "Assimilation" and the Power of Language 
 In addition to these considerations, the French government (and French society in 
general) must pay specific attention to the set of vocabulary that is currently being used. 
L'intégration seems thus far to be the political watchword of the 21st century, but does 
the term really, fundamentally mean? The principal definition given by the Oxford 
English Dictionary is the following: "The making up or composition of a whole by adding 
together or combining the separate parts or elements; combination into an integral whole: 
a making whole or entire."194 This definition implies a certain harmony to the process of 
creating the whole, a certain ease with which the different yet equally important parts fit 
together as one. It does not require that the disparate parts change shape or form to have a 
place with the rest; rather, it all comes together organically.  
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 By contrast, the definition of the word "assimilation" does contain the supposition 
that the individual, different parts will change in order to fit in. The OED defines 
assimilation as "The action of making or becoming like; the state of being like; similarity, 
resemblance, likeness."195 So assimilation differs from integration rather drastically, even 
though the two are often used interchangeably as synonyms. The question then becomes, 
is the act of integration in France measuring up to its own definition? Wallach Scott does 
not think so. She suggests that what the French government is calling integration is 
actually just a glorified push for assimilation: "While seeming to wrestle with the various 
ways to integrate North Africans into French society, [government policy] actually only 
entertained one idea. The standard for becoming French remained what it had long been: 
assimilation."196 Indeed, it would seem that the French model of "integration" would 
prefer that the migrant conform completely to the traditional French way of life, shedding 
other cultural customs in favor of blending in and becoming indistinguishable from other 
members of society.  
 "Assimilation," then, would seem a more apt term for what the government 
actually expects. And if this is the case, the vocabulary needs to be changed. Government 
workers must use more honest and more transparent terminology that does not, in 
practice, fall short of its own expectations. Asking immigrants to "integrate" when they 
are really being asked to "assimilate" creates dismay and disillusionment on the part of 
migrants when they realize what they are really being asked to do, building mistrust of 
the government and of the nation itself. The migrant feels that he or she has been 
purposefully misled, and erects emotional and psychological barriers against the same 
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abstract body of the nation that he or she is being asked to integrate into. Integration 
programs (as well as other facets of the immigration process) would thus be better 
received by migrants and would be more successful if the current vocabulary were 
reevaluated.  
 The Ministère de l'Intérieur's annual Prix de l'Intégration, or "Integration Prize," 
is a perfect example of the French government's misuse of the term. Every year, locally 
elected leaders from each département (province) nominate a series of candidates from 
their respective areas and submit them to the Ministère for consideration. These 
candidates are first, second, or (more recently) third-generation immigrants who are 
determined to have "integrated" exceptionally well into French culture. Common criteria 
for nominations are education in French schools, impressive professional 
accomplishments in France, overcoming past adversity, and involvement in the 
community. More concrete benchmarks like achieving fluency in French or becoming 
naturalized as a French citizen are also looked upon favorably. Upon receiving the 
nominations, the Ministère appoints a committee, which reviews the candidates and 
selects the eventual winner. The winner is then nationally recognized at a ceremony held 
by the Ministère and provided with a cash prize, the reward for being the Best and Most 
Successfully Integrated of them all.  
 It is apparent that what the Prix de l'Intégration is really celebrating is not 
integration, but assimilation. It is not the man who holds a doctorate from a school in 
Algeria or the woman who attended medical school in Lebanon who will win the prize--
after all, holders of foreign degrees are not a direct reflection of the French state. It is the 
person who has "escaped" adversity in his or her home country and who comes to France 
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to better him or herself that the government is looking to choose. It is these candidates, 
who have used all of the ressources incroyables available in belle France to pull 
themselves up by their bootstraps that are the desirable ones, because they reflect 
positively on the "integration" work that the government is doing. By holding a public, 
national competition such as this one, the French government is not only grossly 
misrepresenting the term "integration" but also earning the disdain of a great many 
migrants. They resent having their own accomplishments fall short of others who might 
have taken a more traditionally "French" route to success, and rightfully so: each 
migrant's parcours is unique, and should not be objectified and compared to that of 
another.     
 Politicians must also pay particular attention to the language they are using to 
refer to immigration during speeches and debates. The politician is, by nature, a public 
figure. The members of French society--and indeed, of any society--count on their public 
figures to be a barometer for public opinion. So the vocabulary that politicians use is 
especially important, because it shapes (whether consciously or unconsciously) the way 
that the whole of society thinks about and interprets any given issue. Rosello, who has 
studied political discourse and immigration in France extensively, points out that political 
rhetoric all too often contains underlying and misleading information about immigration: 
"Political discourses seem to invite us to treat immigrants as if 'France', the country, 
functioned like a self-contained private house where the owner receives a relative...the 
representatives of the state, in their political speeches, speak as though France is the 
house and the immigrants, the Guest, with a capital G."197  
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 Setting up binary representations in speech such as the one Rosello mentions has 
very dangerous implications. The power of language in determining the reality of a 
situation is all too often underestimated, and this has definitely been the case with the 
binaries that have been employed by politicians in France to describe immigration. So a 
new vocabulary must again be sought, one that will not perpetuate a series of reductive 
and therefore unproductive binary oppositions.   
 
iii. Collective Memory: The Importance of Moving Forward        
 Finally, the government must continue to encourage honest and open discussion 
about the traumatic events that have taken place in France's past. The Franco-Algerian 
War was one of the single most traumatic events in French history, and the deep 
psychological wounds that it resulted in continue to inform the way that North African 
immigrants are viewed in France today: "The conflict between white French society and 
the country's minorities has roots in the bitter legacy of the Algerian war of independence 
from French rule more than four decades ago."198 The connection between current the 
French perception of immigration and France's colonial history in Algeria is undeniable, 
but it is one that goes largely unspoken, even 50 years after the War's end. 
  In 1999, the French government officially acknowledged that a war in Algeria had 
taken place, but it has yet to issue a formal apology for having systematically tortured 
and killed thousands of indigenous Algerians and FLN party members. This lack of 
apology persists despite campaign promises made to the public by Nicolas Sarkozy in 
2007: "Sarkozy promised that, once in power, he would officially recognise France's 
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'responsibility in the abandonment and killing of harkis and thousands of other Muslims 
who trusted France, so the forgotten will not be killed again.' Five years later, members 
of various pied-noir and harkis associations are still waiting for that apology."199 Adel 
Gastel of France 24 News points out that, furthermore, the digital French Archives on the 
subject are sorely lacking: "The website explanation ends with an abrupt, 'During this 
period, the bloodshed continued and affected all communities: Europeans and Muslims, 
civilians and military.' In one concise line, the trauma of a generation and the birth pains 
of a new nation have been summarised."200 The description is four short paragraphs in 
total.  
   This shroud of silence must be lifted before France will be able to resolve the 
tensions regarding immigrants that exist in the national body. A lack of verbalization of 
intense emotions like pain and guilt has been damning for any kind of progress between 
immigrants and the French government that might otherwise have been made. It is silence 
that has allowed this pain and guilt to deepen, and it is silence that spawns resentment-
fueled episodes like the 2005 riots in the French banlieues. Officially apologizing for the 
practice of torture during the Franco-Algerian War would pave the way for a healing 
dialogue, not only on a national level but also on an individual level. In the meantime, 
public platforms such as the French Archives website should consider it their duty to 
provide as much accurate and honest information as possible about the events of the War. 
Four paragraphs is not a sufficient length for an account of the Franco-Algerian War, and 
abbreviating its history only heightens the taboo nature of the subject in the public space.  
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 Encouraging dialogue about the War would go far to assuage the vaults of 
collective pain, shame, and guilt that continue to be felt in today's France. And 
encouraging critical, honest dialogue about French national identity outside of the 
political sphere would do wonders to improve the perception and treatment of immigrant 
populations. As Wallach Scott states, "[France] need[s] to come up with new ways of 
addressing difference, ways that acknowledge its existence rather than refusing to engage 
it. The old ways, the insistence on sameness and assimilation, aren't working."201 France 
has come far from its Revolutionary prototype of 1789 "in which all souls would grow 
larger through the continual communication of republican sentiments,"202 and it is only 
through continued dialogue and the eventual acceptance of its past that France will be 
able to move forward.  
                       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
201
 Wallach Scott, 17  
202
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CISLA Addendum 
 Immigration is not, in itself, a modern phenomenon. Some of the earliest peoples 
to walk this planet were nomadic, and did not consider themselves defined and bound by 
geographical borders in quite the same way that we do today. What is modern about 
immigration, however, are the perceptions associated with it. The way that each 
individual country perceives and approaches immigration in the modern context is very 
intricately bound up with sentiments about its own national identity, and in a world that 
is seemingly more and more of a sprawling colossus every day, it can be difficult for a 
country to navigate its place in it.  
 It is from here that my interest, and my topic for my Senior Honors Thesis, arises. 
I have undertaken to examine, in a very broad sense, the perception of immigration in 
France. This topic allows for consideration of a wide array of factors that are relevant to 
the discussion of immigration in contemporary France: things like integration, housing, 
religious differences, police and youth violence, and cultural anxiety. In writing this 
addendum, I am going to take the liberty of allowing my subject to remain similarly 
broad. I will endeavor to apply the third CISLA question, about material, spiritual, and 
ethical challenges, to immigration in France today, and in doing so I will touch on a wide 
array of points. It is my hope that the ensemble of these points will contribute to a 
robustness of vision that will help you, the reader, understand some of the things that my 
Thesis is really, fundamentally about.    
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 The material challenges that come with immigration to France are manifold. First 
and foremost, there is the issue of housing. Housing and overcrowding have long since 
been major problems in densely populated areas of France, like Lyon and the entire 
département of Ile-de-France (the département that encompasses Paris and its environs). 
The concern about housing began in the early 1960's, when France received an influx of 
migrants from its former African colonies. These migrants, who already spoke the French 
language, arrived seeking a whole slew of new prospects: better jobs, better living 
conditions, better opportunities for their offspring, and generally better lives. They 
already spoke the French language, but most of them had never been to France before, 
and they were enchanted with the romantic vision of the country that spans the globe. In 
keeping with this vision, the vast majority of these migrants headed for Paris, eager for 
les grands jardins in the spring, the bustling boulevards, and the sparkling lights of the 
Eiffel Tower.  
  These things were not, however, what they found. The French government's 
response to this wave of migration was to expand on their collection of HLM. HLM, or 
habitation à loyer modéré (rent-controlled apartments), seemed to be the perfect solution 
to prevent what would otherwise be a housing crisis: they were expansive, inexpensive to 
construct, and affordable for immigrants. And, initially, the HLM functioned quite well as 
the go-to solution for immigrant housing. But today, it is quite a different story. Many of 
the HLM were not properly kept over the years, and as a result are now extremely 
dilapidated and dirty. Spatial and social isolation have also made the HLMs incredibly 
desolate places to live. Cut off from outlets of culture and social interaction (like movie 
theaters, shopping malls, and museums), the inhabitants of the HLMs are more likely to 
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experience depression and general cultural disillusionment. Crime in the banlieues 
(suburbs) where the HLMs are located has also become a very real problem. Recognizing 
that the HLMs no longer provide immigrants and their families with acceptable living 
conditions, the French government has begun to raze certain complexes. But financial 
(and, dare I say, bureaucratic) constraints have prevented hundreds of HLMs from being 
inspected and razed.    
  In this way, the challenge of immigrant housing is a double-edged sword: not only 
is it a material challenge, but it is an ethical challenge as well. Given the miserable state 
of a large number of the HLMs, immigrant housing becomes quite an exploitative 
process. The reality of it is that the majority of migrants who arrive in France already 
have extremely limited financial and cultural capital, so their options for finding housing 
and paying for that housing are extremely narrow. The HLMs are, in most cases, the only 
thing that is financially feasible, especially where whole immigrant families with many 
mouths to feed are concerned. So if there is only one option, and if that option isn't 
suitable to live in by anyone's standards (least of all the members of the government that 
created it), where is there left to go? And where does the line get drawn--to what extent is 
the French government responsible for securing migrants (particularly non-refugees) with 
housing? What should the standards for HLM housing be?   
 Another material challenge facing immigration to the EU in general is the 
financing of integration programs. The European Union stipulates that all of its member 
countries must have some sort of integration policy in effect for immigrants, but what it 
does not explicitly stipulate is which party--the State or the migrants themselves--should 
bear the brunt of the expenses. This also becomes an ethical question. Is it really okay to 
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make immigrants, who are typically coming from extremely economically disadvantaged 
areas, pay any sum of money for an integration program? Especially when it is the host 
country, and not the migrant, that deems the integration process necessary in the first 
place.  
 It is true that the integration process that the host country has put in place usually 
ends up benefitting the migrant, improving (among other things) their language skills and 
overall employability. But I spent all summer studying the various integration programs 
that are in place in the European Union, and it is my opinion that not all of them are 
developed enough to justify asking a migrant to pay several hundred Euros in order to 
participate. The variability of the quality and character of the integration programs across 
the EU member countries is huge, and as of yet there is no real regulating body that holds 
the member countries' programs to an established set of standards. France's integration 
program happens to be free of charge for migrants, which is wonderful.  
 Even from here, though, another ethical question arises: is it okay to mandate that 
immigrants integrate into the host country? Because (at least, in the European Union) 
integration is not a choice: it is a pre-requisite that migrants must fulfill in order to obtain 
a residence permit. The widely accepted answer to the "is integration ethical" question is 
yes. The French government claims that it regards integration as a reciprocal process, 
necessitating efforts from both the State and the migrant him or herself. But in the case of 
France, the State doesn't give as much as the migrant does. Yes, it provides an integration 
program that is free for migrants. Yes, it provides expedited and specialized programs for 
asylum seekers. But while the migrant is, in most cases, striving to integrate into French 
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society and working incredibly hard to get a job, find housing, and learn the French 
language, the State remains incredibly ideologically closed-minded.  
 The perception of immigration in France, even by government workers, continues 
to be shockingly negative, and this perception is perpetuated by the extremely rigid 
definition of national identity that the State continues to promote. Liberté, Egalité, 
Fraternité: Freedom, Equality, and Brotherhood. It's all well and good when it's sounded 
from the hills, but if certain populations living in France are being left out of the 
equation, it isn't really functioning the way it should. So the way the State has been 
framing French national identity is actually contributing to a lack of reciprocity within 
the integration process for migrants. They are essentially trying to integrate into a society 
whose State-established self-definition already excludes them.  
 The spiritual challenges associated with immigration to France are also manifold, 
and, like the material challenges, are riddled with ethical questions. The debate about the 
foulard (the headscarf, or hijab) in France has received a lot of publicity in recent years, 
and so will serve as an appropriate and relevant example. But in order to fully understand 
the debate surrounding the headscarf, one must first understand the concept of laïcité. 
Laïcité, or secularism, has an incredible importance in French life. For the French, it is 
much more than just a practice, like it is in the United States; rather, it is a deeply valued 
and deeply ingrained way of life, that factors into the makeup of their very identifies. So 
when the government passed a law in 2004 that banned the wearing of the hijab in public 
schools, it did not foresee the law as being particularly problematic, because it was in 
accordance with the principles of laïcité. As it turned out, the law was intensely 
problematic. It infuriated a lot of people--Muslims, some French, and international 
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onlookers--who thought that the law was unjust. The law became fringed with ethical 
questions: does disallowing the headscarf in academic spaces constitute a breach of 
individual rights? Is it reasonable to expect, as the French government does, that the 
public space always remain secular, and that only the private space be used for religiosity 
and faith?  
 The opponents of the anti-headscarf law pointed out that there was a double 
standard in play. Visible signs of Islamic faith, like the headscarf, were prohibited in 
schools, but visible signs of Christian or Jewish faith (like crosses and kippahs) were not. 
The statements that various French politicians made concerning the law also angered 
them. The politicians claimed that the headscarf was symbolic of the oppression of 
women by a patriarchal society, and that what they were really doing by passing the law 
was enforcing the French principle of Egalité. The counter-argument to this statement is 
that not all women wear the headscarf for the same reasons. Yes, it can be a symbol of 
the subjugation of women. But some (many) women who wear the headscarf today 
choose to wear it of their own volition. In this way, the headscarf can also be viewed as a 
symbol of women's empowerment. All in all, it is an incredibly complicated and sensitive 
issue that France is still grappling with today.  
 All of these things that I have mentioned are inarguable challenges that today's 
France faces. And they are difficult challenges to confront and to reconcile, especially 
because immigration has become such a highly politicized issue just about everywhere. 
But immigration can be every bit as much an advantage and an opportunity as it is a 
"problem." Approaching it from a humanitarian standpoint would go a long way in 
destigmatizing immigration in today's France. Because ultimately, when you put aside 
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things like racism and xenophobia, immigration is just groups of humans who desire a 
change.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 103
Works Referenced 
 
Adamson, Kay. Algeria: A Study in Competing Ideologies. New York, NY: Cassell 
 Publishing, 1998.Web.  
 
"Algerian Revolution Echoes in French Violence." Weekend Edition Sunday. 
 National Public Radio. 4 Dec. 2005. Web. 03 May 2012. Transcript. 
 
"Assimilation." 30 Apr. 2012. Old English Dictionary. 
 <http://www.oed.com/view/Entryy/11934?redirectedFrom=assimilation#eid > 
 
Begag, Azouz. Ethnicity & Equality: France in the Balance. Lincoln, Nebraska: 
 University of Nebraska Press, 2007. Print.  
 
Bennhold, Katrin and Bernard, Ariane. "77 Police Officers Hurt in Paris Riots." New 
 York Times. 27 Nov. 2007. Nytimes.com. Web. 27 Nov. 2007.   
 
"Bonaparte: seul maître." Encylopédie Larousse. Web. 08 Nov. 2011. 
 <http://www.larousse.fr/encyclopedie/divers/Bonaparte/114517 
 Larousse.fr> 
 
Bowen, John R. Can Islam Be French? Pluralism and Pragmatism in a Secularist State. 
 Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010. Print. 
 
Burke, Edmund. The annual register, or, A view of the history, politics, and 
 literature for the year 1795. London, England: the Proprietors of Dodley's Annual 
 Register, 1800. Web. 4 Nov. 2011. 
 
Charef, Mehdi. Tea in the Harem. Trans. Ed Emery. London, England: Serpent's Tail, 
 1989. Print.  
 
"Consulat." Encylopédie Larousse. Web. 08 Nov. 2011. 
 <http://www.larousse.fr/encyclopedie/divers/Consulat/114517 
 Larousse.fr> 
 
Daniel, Jean and Carton, Daniel. "Réprimer pour négocier...L'Algérie, c'était la France?" 
 Nouvel Observateur. 11 Jan. 1996: No. 1627. Nouvelobs.com. Web. 01 Mar. 2012.   
 
De Carmoy, Guy. The Foreign Policies of France: 1944-1968. Chicago, Illinois: Chicago 
 University Press, 1970. Print.  
 
Erlanger, Steve. "France Debates Its Identity, But Some Question Why." New York 
 Times 29 Nov. 2009. Print.  
 
 104
"France remembers the Algerian War, 50 years on." France24.com. France 24. Mar. 19 
 2012. Web. 03 May 2012. Transcript. 
 
Guiraudon, Virginie. "Immigration Policy in France." 1 Jul. 2001. Brookings. Web. 26 
 Apr. 2012. <http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2002/0101france_guiraudon.asp
 x> 
 
Hesse, Carla. "Festivals and the French Revolution: Review." Eighteenth Century Studies 
 22.2. (Winter 1988-1989): 231-235. JSTOR. Web. 4 Oct. 2011.  
 
Hunt, Lynn. "The Rhetoric of Revolution in France."  
 History Workshop 15. (1983): 78-94. JSTOR. Web.  4 Oct. 2011. 
 
"Integration." 30 Apr. 2012. Old English Dictionary. 
 <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/97356?redirectedFrom=integration#eid> 
 
Ireland, Doug. "Why Is France Burning?" The Nation. 29 Nov. 2005. Thenation.com. Web. 13 
 Nov. 2005.    
 
Jones, Jim. "Algerian Independence." West Chester University: History 312. Web. 2010. 
 <http://courses.wcupa.edu/jones/his312/lectures/algeria.html> 
 
Kane, Eileen. Classroom Lecture. Connecticut College. New London, Connecticut, 
 Spring 2011 
 
"Kasbah." 16 Mar. 2012. Old English Dictionary. 
 <http://www.oed.com.peach.conncoll.edu:2048/view/Entry/102597?r edire 
 ctedFrom=Casbah#eid> 
 
Lehning, James R. To Be A Citizen: The Political Culture of the Early French Third 
 Republic. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001. Print.  
 
Luethy, Herbet. France Against Herself: A Perceptive Study of France's Past, Her 
 Politics, and Her Unending Crises. New York, NY: Frederick A. Praegar Inc., 
 1955. Print. 
 
Malinvaud, E. "The Rise of Unemployment in France." Economica 53.210,  1986:  S198-
 199. JSTOR. Web. Apr. 23 2012.   <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2554379?seq=3> 
 
Marcus, Jonathan. National Front and French Politics. New York, NY: New York 
 University Press, 1995. Print.  
 
Marshall, D. Bruce. The French Colonial Myth and Constitution-Making in  the Fourth 
 Republic. London, England: Yale University Press, 1973. Print.  
 
 105
Martin, Gilles. "War in Algeria: The French Experience." Military Review, July-Aug. 
 2005. pg. 51-57. Web.  
 
McMillan, James F. Twentieth Century France: Politics and Society 1898-1991. New 
 York, NY: Routledge, Chapman, and Hall, Inc., 1985. Print.  
 
Mortimer, Mildred. "Tortured Bodies, resilient souls: Algeria's women combatants 
 depicted by Daniele Djamila Amrane-Minne, Louisette Ighilahriz, and Assia 
 Djebar." Research in African Literatures March 22, 2012. JSTOR. Web. Apr. 6 
 2012.  
 
Najdek, Carl. "Revolutionizing Rousseau: An Analysis of the Political Thought of Jean-
 Paul Marat, Georges Jacques Danton, and Maximilien Robespierre." 
 University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2008. Web. 4 Nov. 2011.   
 
"Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821)." BBC History. Web. 11 Nov. 
 2011.<http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_figures/bonaparte_napo leon.shtml> 
 
Rapport, Michael. Nationality and Citizenship in Revolutionary France: The 
 Treatment of Foreigners. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000. Print. 
 
Rogers Brubaker, William. "The French Revolution and the Invention of Citizenship." 
 French Politics and Society 7, 1989: 30-49. Web. 06 Nov. 2011.  
 
Rosello, Mireille. Postcolonial Hospitality: The Immigrant as Guest. Stanford, CA: 
 Stanford University Press, 2001. Print.  
 
Shatz, Adam. "The Torture of Algiers," The New York Review of Books: November 21, 
 2002. Web. Apr. 09 2012. < http://algeria-
 watch.org/farticle/analyse/shatz_torture.htm> 
 
Smith, Tony. The French Stake in Algeria, 1945-1962. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
 Press, 1978. Print.  
 
Stora, Benjamin. Algeria 1830-2000: A Short History. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
 Press, 2001. Print.  
 
Stora, Benjamin. "Histoire et Société: La guerre d'Algérie à la télévision française." 
 Interview by Eugénie Barbezat. Institut national de l'audiovisuel. Print. Jan. 1993.  
 
Tamzali, Wassyla. Une femme en colère. Editions Gallimard, 2009. Print.  
 
Taylor, Jeff. "The New Imperialism and the Scramble for Africa 1800-1914." May  2003. 
 Metropolitan State College of Denver. Web.  
 <http://clem.mscd.edu/~tayljeff/lectures/NewImp.html> 
 
 106
Tombs, Robert. France 1814-1914. New York, NY: Addison Wesley Longman Inc., 
 1996. Print. 
 
Wallach Scott, Joan. Parité!: Sexual Equality and the Crisis of French 
 Universalism. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2005. Print.   
 
Wallach Scott, Joan. The Politics of the Veil. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University  Press, 
 2007. Print.  
 
Wieviorka, Michel. Violence en France. Seuil, 1999. Print. 
 
Wilson, Stephen. "The 'Action Française' in French Intellectual Life." The  Historical 
 Journal 12.2, 1969: 328-350. Web. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2637807> 
 
 
 
 
 
